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l_!i Intr od uc_t i o
n
The construction industry is the largest small business
dominated industry m the US. It historically makes up about 10
percent of our Gross National Product and consumes about 5 percent'
of the US labor force. The construction industry is made up of
nearly 570,000 contractors' of varying size throughout the US.
However, one-half of all construction firms m business today will
not be in business six years from now, according to the Associated
General Contractors.
For the purposes of this study the word "contractor" is taken
to mean construction contractor, whether general, specialty, or
subcontractor unless specified otherwise.
Construction is now and has always been a challenging and
competitive industry. Courage, optimism, and willingness to work
carried yesterday's contractors a long way m the industry.
Although these attributes are still required they don't provide the
same success as they once did. Today's contractor must have
considerable knowledge and great competence in many fields. It is
impossible to run today's construction firm by "the seat of ones
* "Construction Costs Reach Top Floor", ENR, 23 March 1989,
p. 39.
' SBA, The State Of Small Business: A Report To The President,
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 90.

pants". Contractors must know how to get financing and hold the
confidence of their banks and bonding companies. They must
thoroughly understand the principles of engineering and estimating.
They must know how to pick jobs which give the largest profit
margins and develop a successful bidding strategy that works
against tough competitors. They must be familiar with the various
forms of insurance to be able to protect their firm from disastrous
liability claims. Thorough knowledge of labor relations and laws
are essential. Accurate and complete records must be kept of the
company's operations to comply with numerous laws, to properly
m.onitor the company's financial stability, and to combat
litigation. These are but a few of the requirements of today's
successful contractor. Joseph Frein" says, "the strongest candidate
to head a construction company today would be a man under forty
with at least fifteen years of experience in the construction
industry preceded by university training and majors in civil
engineering, business administration, and contract law."
According to Dun and Bradstreet' historically about 92 percent
of all construction firm failures occur because of mismanagement
Joseph P. Frein, Handbook of Construction Management and
Organization 2nd Edition, New York: Van Nost rand Reinhol d Co, 1980.
Dun & Bradstreet, Business Economics Division, The Business
Failure Record, 1960 through 1979 and Commercial Failures In An Era
Of Business Progress 1900-1952, New York: Dun & Bradstreet Inc.,
1900-1979. The value of 92 percent is an average value determined
from each years failure report for all management related causes
of failure listed through 1979. D & B lists non-management causes
as Neglect, Fraud, Disaster, and Reason Unknown. Table C-2 in
Appendix C shows this tabulation.
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in some form or another. The remaining 8 percent is generally
considered insignificant and classified as failure due to reasons
unknown, fraud, neglect, or disaster. Although the largest portion
of this 8 percent is classified as unknown (normally about 5
percent), it is assumed these causes for failure are all external
to a firms management. Agreeably the 8 percent is numerically small
compared to the other 92 percent, but knowledge of the reasons
behind this 8 percent of failures may give a contractor the edge
he needs to survive in tough markets. In fact as discussed later
in chapter 4, from the newest format of reporting business failures
by Dun & Bradstreet it can be determined that non-management causes
may account for as much as 20 percent of construction company
failures. This larger percentage makes studies such as this even
more valid and valuable to today's construction entrepreneur.
1 . 2 Object ives
This paper attempts to explore the non-management causes of
construction firm failures. In this study adequate construction
management is assumed and held as a constant so that causes for
failure external to a construction firms management can be focused
upon. Effort was made when data permitted to limit the scope of
this study to small construction firms because of the vastness of
the topic and the differences in the strengths and weaknesses of
small and large firms. However, as can be seen in Figure 1.1, large
construction firms make up only about 2% of the industry and thus
most data published about the construction industry in general is
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Source: See Table C-3.
applicable to both small and large construction firms. Attempts
will be made to look for trends, approaches, policies, and types
of contractors that are successful in today's small construction
industry. In addition to stating conclusions about the findings of
this research a guide is presented in Chapter 5 in attempt to
assist contractors in protecting themselves from the less
controllable pitfalls inherent to the construction industry.
1.3 Information Search and Lit erature Revi ew
Significant difficulties were encountered in the search for

information and statistics on this topic, even on construction firm
failures in general. No single article or publication could be
found that dealt specifically or thoroughly with the causes of
either large or small construction firm failures. One reason very
little information has been published on these failures is there
has never been a central organization or agency willing to take on
the momentous task of compiling and recording the needed statistics
following construction firm failures. Even national surety
organizations and surety companies, who's business it is to know
why construction firms fail, don't do it". Surprisingly, only 30.9
percent of construction lending officers keep statistics on
financial losses caused by contractor failures". The US Small
Business Administration (SBA) is attempting to change this,
however. For the past several years the SBA has made tremendous
efforts at developing a computerized database of the country's
small businesses.
The information search for this report began by using the
Georgia Tech library on-line information system. Through this
service numerous books and magazine articles were found with titles
and subject descriptions that suggested great potential for
providing information toward this research. Upon review of much of
' See the various interviews with surety bond associations and
agents in Appendix A.
A study by The Surety Association of America and The
National Association of Surety Bond Producers, Losses In Private
Sector Construction Due to Contractor Failure, Audrey Inc., 1988.
pp. 5.

the literature it was discovered the topic of construction firm
failures was generally only mentioned in a discussion of some other
topic and an analysis of construction firm failures could not be
found. In the articles and books reviewed the topic of construction
firm failures was continually skirted. Many books, journals, and
magazines reviewed such as Engineering News Record were used by
plucking bits and pieces of applicable information from each. The
most helpful literature found were statistical reports by the SBA
and Dun & Bradstreet. These reports provided several statistics on
the construction industry. However, again very little explanation
was given on construction firm failures. Through local SBA
officials, existence of the SBA's central data bank in Washington
DC, mentioned above, was learned. With great expectations a letter
was mailed to the SBA's Office of Economic Research (a copy of
which is provided in Appendix B) which maintains the central SBA
database. Although the SBA's database personnel (who are there to
provide information to the public) seemed very nice and willing to
help, it took 3 or 4 phone calls and a second letter only to
receive some not very helpful excerpts from their database and a
Dun & Bradstreet report. They did suggest some SBA publications
which were found at the Georgia Tech library and proved very
helpful. The SBA's written response with data is provided in
Appendix B as is all other correspondence generated from this
study. A computerized economics database/information service leased
from the Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates Group on the
3rd floor of the Georgia Tech Price Gilbert Library was another

source used in compiling much of the tables and graphs used in this
study.
Manipulation of the statistics from SBA, Dun & Bradstreet,
and the Wharton database only yielded marginal insight into the
factors effecting the construction industry from a non-management
standpoint and thus more information was desired. The author
decided to talk to some surety bond companies since they along with
the banking industry should deal with contractor failures more than
any other group/industry. Originally the objective of the
interviews was simply to gam additional written sources of
information. As stated earlier this proved futile. There are
essentially no statistics kept by surety companies or their
professional organizations that would benefit this study. Although
the interviews yielded little or no statistical data, they yielded
considerable insight and theories on the reasons for non-management
contractor failures. These interviews led to letters and some phone
interviews with national surety associations as well as other
sources. The interviews were not conducted using any scientific
format such as asking each person the same list of questions in a
particular order or having them fill out a questionnaire. It was
the desire of the author not to lead the discussions but to
encourage the person being interviewed to provide their own
thoughts on what they felt the non-management problems facing
construction firms today and in the past are. Some specific
questions were necessarily asked from time to time to keep the
conversation flowing and within the study's scope. This approach

was felt to be the most advantageous since there are no preliminary
studies that could be used to define a list of questions that would
not tend to be limiting. All correspondence and interviews are
presented in Appendices A and B. A large part of this report was
developed from information noted during these interviews.
The Peachtree Corners Library in Gwinette at 5570 Spaulding
(phone 729-1028) which contains a substantial business section was
investigated at the recommendation of one the Georgia Tech
librarians. It proved to be of limited value for this research but
other research relating to business may do very well there. Also
the Georgia State Library was utilized because the more recent
publications of the Dun & Bradstreet Failure Reports were available
there
.
Two additional sources of information were investigated: the
IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) database and local court records
both of which proved prohibitive to this research because of the
enormous amount of time that would be required to search them. The
data that could have been retrieved from the SCI would have been
of limited value and for the most part already available through
Dun & Bradstreet publications. The court records would probably
have been of value but were too vast to search since they are filed
by case number not subject.
Despite the authors lack of success when corresponding
directly with the SBA for specific data from their database,
publications produced from the database were very useful and the
database has great potential for future research into the small

construction industry. To have a more accurate and up to date
database the SBA is even in 1990 installing a new computer
communications network to connect its 10 regional offices as well
as its financial operations office in Denver to the agency's
computer center in Washington DC .
^ S. A. Masud, "SBA To Get 1st FTS Data Service," Government




THE SMALL CONSTRUCTION FIRM
2.1 Definitions
The Small Business Administration (SBA) does not have a single
definition to differentiate small businesses from large ones. In
general it defines a small business as one that is independently
owned and operated and not dominant in its field. To be eligible
for SBA loans and other SBA assistance, a business must fall within
certain size standards as defined by the agency for the particular
type of business being conducted. This standard can be based on the
annual receipts, assets, net worth, and/or number of employees
depending on the type of industry and SBA program. For most
industries the size is based on the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code defined for each industry by the
Department of Labor. The size standard for many industries is based
on both gross revenues and number of employees. This will not work
for the construction industry however, since contractors with very
few employees execute contracts of very large dollar amounts
through subcontractors. For the construction industry the size
standard is based on gross receipts only. The SBA defines annual
receipts as the average gross receipts received over the previous
three years, less sales of fixed assets, transfers between
affiliates and taxes remitted. Once annual receipts are determined
one can simply look through the SIC codes, shown in Table 2.1, and
read the corresponding maximum size for a small construction firm





Standard Industry Classification Codes
SIC DESCRIPTION SIZE.
MAJOR GROUP 15-BUILDING CONSTRUCTION -GENERAL CONTRACTORS
AND OPERATIVE BUILDERS
1521 General Contractors-Single Family Houses .... $17.00
1522 General Contractors-Residential Buildings Other
Than Single Family $17.00
1531 Operative Builders $17.00
1541 General Contractors-Industrial Buildings and
Warehouses $17.00
1542 General Contractors-Nonresidential Buildings,
Other than Industrial Buildings
and Warehouses $17.00
MAJOR GROUP 16-CONSTRUCTION OTHER THAN BUILDING
CONSTRUCTION-GENERAL CONTRACTORS
1611 Highway and Street Construction $17.00
1622 Bridge, Tunnel and Elevated Highway Construction $17.00
1623 Water, Sewer, Pipeline, Comm'onication and
Power Line Construction $17.00
1628 Heavy Construction, Expert Dredging, N.E.C. . . . $17.00
1629 Dredging and Surface Cleanup Activities .... $ 9.50
MAJOR GROUP 17-CONSTRUCTION, SPECIAL TRADE CONTRACTORS
1711 Plumbing, Heating (except electric),
and Air Conditioning $ 7.00
1721 Painting, Paper Hanging, and Decorating $ 7.00
1731 Electrical Work $ 7.00
1741 Masonry, Stone Setting, and Other Stone Work . . $ 7.00
1743 Plastering, Drywall, Acoustical,
and Insulation Work $ 7.00
1751 Carpentry $ 7.00
1752 Floor Laying and Other Floor Work $ 7.00
1761 Roofing and Sheet Metal Work $ 7.00
1771 Concrete Work $ 7.00
1781 Water Well Drilling $ 7.00
1791 Structural Steel Erection $ 7.00
1793 Glass and Glazing Work $ 7.00
1794 Excavation and Foundation Work $ 7.00
1795 Wrecking and Demolition Work $ 7.00
1796 Installation or Erection of Building Equip., N.E.C $ 7.00
1799 Special Trade Contractors, N.E.C $ 7.00
Notes: Size standards preceded by $ are in millions of dollars.
N.E.C. - Not Elsewhere Classified
Mining and Quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except
fuels, are included under major group 14. All SICs under
group 14, related to the construction industry, have
size standards of 500 employees.
Source: SBA Regional Office in Atlanta Georgia.
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"C" of the Standard Industrial Classification system. The SIC codes
in general define a small construction firm as a company with
annual receipts not exceeding from $7 to $17 million dollars
depending upon the type of contractor. A sharp change occurs in the
size definition however, when a contractor seeks surety guarantees
from the SBA. In order for a construction firm to qualify for a SBA
guaranteed surety bond the firms average annual receipts for the
past three years cannot exceed $3.5 million dollars.
Another term that needs to be clearly defined is business
failure. This study will use the Dun & Bradstreet definition of
business failure since much of their statistics are used in this
report. Dun & Bradstreet defines a business failure as any business
that ceased operations following assignment of bankruptcy; ceased
with loss to creditors after such actions as execution, foreclosure
or attachment; voluntarily withdrew leaving unpaid obligations;
were involved in court actions such as receivership; reorganization
or arrangement; or voluntarily compromised with creditors [Dun &
Brad87]. Businesses that discontinue operations (for reasons of
difficulty or not) and have paid their creditors in full are not
recorded by Dun & Bradstreet as failures. Dun & Bradstreet suggests
that business discontinuances with loss to creditors only make up
a small percentage of the total discontinuances that occur each
year. In fact Dun & Bradstreet says most withdrawals from their
records are transfers of ownership or voluntary liquidations in
which there is no loss to creditors. These discontinuances
outnumber failures by an estimated 25 to 1 [Dun & Brad60]. Dun &
12
'^ -.
Bradstreet says they report only failures with loss to creditors
because those failures have the most severe impact upon the
economy. They also feel discontinuances and failures tend to follow
the same trends.
2.2 The Small Business Administration ,.
,
Due in part to the rate of bankruptcies among small businesses
in the early 1950's, and increasing awareness of the important role
that small business plays in the American economy and war time
strength, congress passed the "Title II Act of July 1953" better
known as the Small Business Act of 1953. It is this act that
eventually established the SBA and set its goals. The intent of the
act was to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect the interests of the
country's small businesses". The SBA was given the responsibility
of creating a business atmosphere which would foster the economic
interests of small business, insure a competitive economic climate,
ensure adequate capital is available to small business at
reasonable rates, and provide an opportunity for entrepreneurship
and inventiveness.
The SBA is able to assist construction companies in many ways
but most of which are under utilized. The primary reason for this
underutilization of SBA programs is lack of knowledge of the
existence of such programs by the business community''. The SBA can
Alan M. Wironen, Small Business Administration Impacts On
The Construction Industry, Special Research Problem, Georgia
Institute of Technology, School of Civil Engineering, August 1988.
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assist contractors through guaranteeing construction bonds of new
construction firms that may otherwise be unable to qualify for
bonding, secure financing when a firm has not yet established
sufficient credit, provide valuable counseling and training in
management of the firm, and many other types of assistance. Since
the inception of the SBA the nation's small businesses have been
gaining strength but for the most part without the help of the SBA.
Gaining strength none the less. Through more utilization of the SBA
by construction firms, failures could become fewer and more
control labl e
.
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Figure 2.2 Source: See Table C-4
In 1945, according to Dun & Bradstreet, 92 contractors failed
leaving total liabilities of $3,600,000. In 1950 there were 912
failures, nearly ten times the amount of 1945, The liabilities
increased just over seven times to $25,600,000. In 1960 there were
2600 failures, leaving liabilities of $201 million, which is nearly
eight times the liabilities of ten years earlier. In 1967 the
number of failures dropped to 2200, but the liabilities increased
another 60 percent to $323 million. These trends are clearly
depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Recently in 1986 construction
15

failures reached an all time high of 7109. But the large number of
recent failures has not dampened the entrepreneurial spirit of the
construction industry. In 1988 according to the Small Business
Administration in its annual address to the President, the
construction industry (especially special trade contractors) was
one of the fastest growing industries in the US. This is despite
an overall downward national trend for all business starts and
incorporation. As an additional measure of the health of the
construction industry in Figure 2.3 construction firm failures as
a percentage of total business failures are plotted. This graph
shows that as a percentage of total business failures the
construction industry is doing better than it has in the past 30
years. However, as shown in Figure 2.2 a continued trend toward
increased liabilities exists. This should be expected however
because of the increasing number of contractors and the devaluation
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This section contains various findings from the research phase
of this study. Except for section 3.5 Construction Surety, the
findings are listed singularly under a corresponding general topic
heading along with source. They are listed in no particular order
and may consist of a single statement, graph, table, or several
paragraphs depending upon the subject and depth of explanation
necessary to convey the finding. To simplify bibliographical
referencing for this chapter referencing is done strictly using
brackets "[ ]" which correspond to the bibliography section at the
end of this report.
3.1 CONSTRUCTION FIRM STATISTICS
--The total number of construction firms in the US in 1986
was 566,810.
60.5 percent of the firms had only 1 to 4 employees.
87 percent had less than 20 employees.
96.4 percent had less than 50 employees.
99.2 percent had less than 100 employees
.
[SBA89 p . 90
]
--Over the past 10 years the percentage of construction firms
with <20, <100, <500 employees has remained nearly constant except
for a slight shift (about 1 percent) of firms moving into the next
larger category. [SBA 88]
--From a financial statistics survey conducted in 1986 it was
if

determined that small construction firms are on the average
receiving an operating profit of 5.6 percent where as firms earning
over $50 million in annual revenues reported a median operating
profit of only 0.5 percent. [SUB86]
--Profit was better for firms in the northeast that were open
shops and doing primarily government work. [SUB86]
--General contractors on the average collect their payments
20 days faster than subcontractors. [SUB86]
--Figure 3.1 suggests an upward trend in construction profits
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATIONS
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despite the large fluctuations following 1975
19
C J ^•
--From a study done by Georgia State University in 1979 for
the SBA, the fields where new firms have the best chance of success
are manufacturing, contract construction , and services. [SBA 81,
p. 87]
--In 1988 although home building was not a source of major
growth in new jobs, employment in housing renovation, remodeling,
and repair activity did expand rapidly. [SBA89]
3.2 ECONOMIC TRENDS
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of the GNP. Private construction spending for 1986 constituted 83%
of total construction spending. Private construction spending was
estimated to be 64% in 1976 [ SAA&NASPB88 , pp. 1-2]. This could
indicate a rise in private spending or a drop in government
spending. A drop in government sending is more likely.
-- The prime lending rate (set by the Federal Reserve)
reflects a trend toward increasing interest rates. Figure 3.2 (a
graph showing a 35 year history of the prime rate) when compared
to Figure 2.1 (construction failures) displays a trend that
suggests the prime rate leads construction firm failures by at
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least 1 year. When interest rates peaked, failures peaked about 1
year later.
--Figure 3.3, a graph of conventional mortgage interest rates
for new homes, shows that it roughly follows the same trends as the
prime rate although not nearly as pronounced.
--The value of "residential" construction put in place over
the past 35 years reflects a drop in construction activity also
about a year after a rise in interest rates. New home construction
is often said to be the first industry to face difficulty in a weak
economy. See Figure 3.4
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--Consumer Price Index data provided in Appendix C Table C-6
and Figure C-6. 3 shows only and upward trend and reflects no
correlation between itself and construction failures. This is not
unexpected as it primarily reflects the continued devaluation of
the dollar accompanying inflation.
--The construction industry percent of the domestic gross
national product was also investigated to see if it might be
utilized as a planning tool for construction managers. But it
provided no new insight and tended simply to react to the prime
rate. A table and graph of the construction industry domestic GNP
CONSTRUCT ION I NDUSTRY
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is provided as Table C-1 and Figure C-1.
3.3 LABOR AND WAGES
--Results failed to support union claims that higher wages are
justified by higher productivity. [SUB86]
--The number of full and part-time employees in the
construction industry has continued to grow over the past 35 years
but not without sharp cuts in employees in 1974 through 1976 and
1979 through 1982. These years of cutbacks correspond directly with
sharp rises in the prime rate. See Figure 3.5.
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS
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-- The average weekly hours of production for construction
workers ranges between 36 and 38 hours per week as shown in
Figure 3.6. No correlation seems to exist between production and
firm f ai lures
.
--A study by the University of Georgia in 1979 found that
union contributions were a significant factor in voting patterns
of congressmen. Unions generally favor government intervention in
the economy. Union membership in a congressman's home state was
less influential than campaign contributions. Unions do a better
job of allocating campaign contributions than does small business.
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A general conclusion was that laws favored by unions would
generally hinder small business. [SBA 81 p. 90]
--Wages and salary in the construction industry have continued
to escalate over the past 30 years. They rose at about 5
percent/year for the past 15 years. See Figure 3.7
-- Annual income of construction firms has climbed at a rate
of about 7.5 percent in order to combat the loss of profits eaten
up by increasing wages. Figure 3.8.
--Workman's compensation in Georgia for roofing contractors
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costs between $13 and $30 dollars per $100 dollars of payroll
according to Mr. Randell Tanner of Huf fines. Tanner, and Russell
Incorporated a Georgia commercial insurance firm.
--As if to negate contractor income increases, total employee
compensation has also climbed at a rate of around 7.5 percent over
the last 15 years. The graph of compensation exhibits almost the
exact same trends as wages and salary. Figure 3.9.
--Labor turnover greatly affects the cost of doing business
and how businesses are operated. Studies have consistently shown
lower tenure and retention rates for small firms. A study sponsored
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by the SBA found that small firms have higher labor turnover in
part because of the characteristics of the workers they hire and
the opportunities for flexible hours they are able to provide.
Small firms hire workers reentering the work force at a much higher
rate than large business. They are more likely to hire teenagers
or low skilled entry level workers, women, and older workers. All
these groups are characterized by above average turnover and a weak
attachment to the labor market. Also professional specialists in
small firms have a higher turnover rate than in large businesses.
Construction
,
personal service, and business repair service workers
have above average turnover rates. [SBA89]
3.4 FAILURE TRENDS
--Construction firm failures of general contractors followed
the same trend as specialty and sub-contractors prior to 1979.
Since 1979 general contractors appear to have failed less often
than subs and specialty contractors. See Figure 3.10.
--Table 3.1 shows construction firm failure rates per 10,000
firms for several years. Overall the failure rate seems to be going
down or possibly stabilizing. According to [PlattSS] now that most
of the industrialization of American is over business failure rates
are stabilizing.
--Unlike Figure 3.10, Table 3.1 shows that specialty
contractors have lower failure rates than general contractors.
Therefore, the reason for the increased number of sub and specialty
contractor failures shown in Figure 3.10 following 1979 is simply
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Construction Firm Failure Rates
Year
CG S< Operative Builder
Contr other than Bldgs
Specialty Contractors
Overall Rate
Number Failures per 10,000 Firms
1950 1960 1970 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
103 199 116
106 115 108 93 97
136 115 114 97 93
113 104 107 90 92
112 109 108 92 94
Source: Rates of years 1950, 60, and 70 are actually 10 year
averages from [Platt85]. 1984 through 1988 are from the new format
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Figure 3.11
Source: Table C-10
--In 1986 30% of all construction company failures occurred
when the companies were between 6 and 10 years old. The
construction industry had the highest failure rate in that age
group of all other industries. [ASS&NASPB88
, pp.3]
--Construction firms fail most frequently when 2 to 6 years
old. See Figure 3.11. . - .
--Working with established contractors didn't necessarily
afford more protection against loss than working with less
established contractors. Failures by established firms are on the
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rise. [ASS&NASBP88 pp. 6, 11] and [interviews]
--Per [ASS&NASBP88 pp.9] the 4 most frequently mentioned
factors in determining whether to recommend or require a surety
bond of a contractor on a private project are, in order of
importance
:
1. Project scope and nature vs. contractor's past
experience.
2. Dollar amount of contract.
3. Contractor's financial statement and credit history.
4. Contractor's years in business.
--In 1967 and 1968 construction contractors had the largest
reduction in failures of any industry, 26 percent. [Dun & Brad68]
--From 1965 to 1968 despite an economic upturn (not including
failures due to managerial deficiencies) the largest cause for
construction failures was the overwhelming of firms by heavy
operating expenses as a result of spiraling prices and wages.
[Dun & Brad68]
--In 1969 the construction industry was depressed and 30
percent of the construction firm failures were attributed to the
slump in home building. [Dun & Brad69]
--Far more older firms are failing compared with the early
1950's. [Dun & Brad72]
--In 1974 during an economic slump, the number of casualties
due to heavy operating expenses nearly doubled. Slow or
uncollectible receivables also accounted for a substantial amount
of failures. [Dun & Brad74]
--In 1975 the hardest hit industry was construction, where
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one-third more contractors failed than in the previous year.
[Dun & Brad75]
--In 1975 sales problems and heavy operating costs were
dominate causes for failure besides managerial problems. [Dun &
Brad75]
--Slow or uncollectible receivables played a growing role in
1975's bankruptcies. The larger the firm the greater the problem.
Downed most often by receivables difficulties were wholesalers of
electrical supplies, printers, building subcontractors and
advertising agencies. [Dun & Brad75]
--The construction industry in 1976 showed the greatest
improvement as the number of contractors failing declined 22
percent [Dun & Brad76]. This substantial improvement followed 2
years of reductions in the prime rate.
--In 1978 a large number of construction failures were
attributed to spiralling inflation and receivables difficulties
[Dun & Brad78]. The prime rate had jumped 3 to 4 percentage points.
--24 percent more general builders failed in 1979 than in the
previous year because of double digit inflation, receivables
difficulties, and credit tightening. [Dun S. Brad79]
--In 1981 22 percent of construction firms failed due to heavy
operating expenses [Platt85].
--The Dun & Bradstreet Failure Report format was changed in
1984 to it's new format displayed in Appendix D.
--Business failure rates are related to a firms's ability to
generate new jobs which in turn demonstrates the importance of
32
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growth to a firm's survival. Approximately 30 percent of non-
growing firms fail within 2 years of their startup date compared
with 8 percent of firms which added at least one employee during
the 2 year interval. [SBA89]





2. Weather/natural disasters '




7. Union strike/labor trouble
8. Illness or death of key employee
9. Walked off the job
10. Dispute with obligee
11. Possible fraudulent operation on part of principal
12. Despondency
13. Co-mingling of funds
14. General's subcontractor in default
15. Sub's general in default
16. Possible sub-busting on part of general
17. IRS lien
18. Sub's general behind schedule
19. Unforseen physical obstacle
20. Shortage of labor




default codes and corresponding reasons for default. These codes
are used by the SBA's surety bond claims office.
33
u ; I 1^:
3.5 Construction Surety
Nearly 7,000 contractors failed in 1987 leaving a trail of
unfinished private and public construction projects with losses
exceeding $2 billion dollars, according to Dun & Bradstreet. Surety
bonds are risk transfer mechanisms written by insurance companies.
They are not the standard 2-party insurance policy but instead a
3-party insurance policy generally involving the contractor, the
surety company, and the project owner. Surety bond companies are
the insurance companies of construction, although some of the
references given in the back of this paper dislike that statement.
Surety bonds are only utilized for approximately 35 percent of all
1
-J- J-
construction'. Surety companies perform a necessary function
throughout the chain of construction players. The owner insures
himself against default by the general contractor, the general
contractor insures himself against the subs and the subs sometimes
even insure themselves against default of a sub-sub.
The Heard Act passed by congress in 1893 supplanted in 1935
by the Miller Act requires that contractors obtain surety bonds for
all federally funded projects. Since then virtually all states have
followed with their own similar legislation. Private construction
bonds about 10 to 25 percent of their projects. Next to
contractors themselves, bonding companies as an industry know and
The value of 35 percent was gained through the interviews
with surety managers given in Appendix A.
2 Losses m Private Sector Construction Due to Contractor
Failure, SAA and NASBP, 1988, pp. 10.
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understand the economic problems of construction firms better than
any other group of people. They must in order to profit at their
business.
Surety underwriting focuses on prequal if ying the contractors
before committing assets to guarantee a contractor's performance.
Before a surety underwriter issues a bond he must be fully
satisfied that the contractor runs a well-managed profitable
enterprise, pays debts, keeps promises, deals fairly with others
and performs obligations in a timely manner. They also look at
whether a contractors experience matches the requirements of the
job for which bonding is requested. The price for a bond normally
ranges from one to five percent of the contract. One of the major
benefits of being bonded on a job is that the bonding company wants
the contractor to succeed as much as the contractor himself. And
in the face of possible default the bonding company will generally
provide all the assistance it can to keep the contractor in
business including provide working capital and other financial
assistance.
Sureties spend a great deal of time and money to train and
develop their underwriters. In a survey of 12 leading surety
companies it was determined that, in a five year period through
1969, only 79 of more than 1100 people hired as surety underwriters
were still on the payrolls . The total cost of training all these
people was more than $41 million dollars but the sureties retained
3 Prem, p. 85.
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less than one tenth of the trainees. In the first two years the
average cost of training each person exceeded $30,000. Although the
underwriter may not always be right, an experienced underwriter
represents a substantial corporate investment. It only makes good
sense for a contractor to take full advantage of the underwriter's






4.1 External Causes of Construction Firm Failures
Annually in their "Failure Report", Dun and Bradstreet states
that 90 percent of all business failures are management related.
Their statistics show that about 92 percent of the construction
firm failures in the US are due to poor management. Most
bibliography listed in the back of this paper state management
controlled reasons such as inadequate cash flow, no growth and
inadequate planning as the primary reasons for contractor default.
Surety statistics indicate that "overexpansion" or taking on more
work than a contractor can handle is probably the major cause for
failure in the building field'. These are all management controlled
problems. There is also a long list of problems that are not
controllable by a firm's management that could lead to default or
bankruptcy. An economic downturn, labor difficulties, material
shortages, the death of a key person, bad weather, and even
fraudulent activity can cause a project or contractor to go into
default. The list of the SBA ' s Default Codes given earlier in Table
3.2 suggest some very interesting reasons for construction firm
failures such as "the sub's general in default" or "the general's
sub in default". In these two cases a firm defaulted because of
the failure of another. While it may be true that the second firm
Joseph P. Frein, Handbook of Construction Management and
Organization, 2nd Ed. NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co, 1980, pp. 85.
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had little control over the first firm's failure it is management's
responsibility to select contractors with which to work that will
not only net the company a profit but last the duration of the
project. Before entering into a contract each party should know
that the other party is able to uphold their end of the bargain.
The other party's financial condition should be reviewed and if
they refuse to give out such information it may be wise to end the
business relationship. This is all a responsibility of management.
Therefore, many of the SBA ' s causes for failure that appear to be
non-management related are actually management related. Also the
sea's list of causes may be better described as symptoms of larger
underlying problems such as inflation and mismanagement than as
sources of failure. However, the fact that the SBA has dealt with
enough of the types of failures listed to give them a code for
conveyance sake, makes them significant.
Dun and Bradstreet until 1984 reported business failures by
breaking them down into 5 major divisions as shown in Table 4.1.
Four are non-management causes, 1) Fraud 2) Disaster 3) Unknown and
4) Neglect. Neglect is used by Dun and Bradstreet to account for
failures because of marital difficulties, poor health, and bad
habits (alcohol is assumed). Dun & Bradstreet included in the fifth
division four subdivisions a) Lack of Line Experience b) Lack of
Managerial Experience c) Unbalanced Experience and d) Incompetence.
The fifth division untitled by Dun and Bradstreet is entitled
Management Causes by the author. The fifth division is clearly
comprised of managerial causes. In 1984 Dun and Bradstreet revised
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the format of their annual Business Failure Report to utilize a
more detailed breakdown of causes. Unknown is no longer a division.
The new format has 10 divisions each with several subdivisions.
Excerpts from an old and new Dun & Bradstreet report are provided
in Appendix D for the readers study.
Table 4.1
ORDERLYISG CAUSES 0? CONSTRUCTION FIRM FillURES
MANAGEMENT REASONS
YEAR CAUSES lEGLECT FRAUD DISASTER USKNOKK TOTAL
196C 9C.5 3.2 1.2 0,4 4.7 100.0





1965 91.9 3.8 1.7 0.5 2.1 100.
1966 34.
2
3.C 1.3 0.4 1 1 100.0
1967
1968 90.8 2.9 0.7 0.7 4.9 . b t. , t




1972 94.2 2.5 1.1 CO 2.2 lOC.C
1973
1974 92.6 2.4 0,7 0.5 3,8 1 ri f r
1975 91.9 1.0 0,3
: ^
5,7 ICC.O
1976 92.1 1.0 C,3 0,9 5.7 ICC.C
1977
1978 92.1 C.9 C.3 C,4 6.3 ICCC
1979 93,6 0.9 0,4 0,1 5.0 100.0
AVERAGE 91.9 2,3 0,8 0,5 4,5
3EL0« VALUES PROM NEW FORMAT 0? D i 3 FAILURE RECORD:
1984 74.2 4.0 0,5 0,7 20.6
1985 79.6 2,7 0.5 0.6 16.6
1986 81.7 1,8 0.4 0.5 15.6
1 fifl ft
1987 8C.6 1.9 0.2 C.4 16.9 .1, t. . u
/ERAGE 79.0 2.6 0.5 0.4 17.5




In order to compare the new format with the old and finish Table
4.1 beyond 1983 the following steps were taken. Values for neglect,
fraud, and disaster along with their subdivisions were left in tact
as non-managerial causes. To determine a value to correspond with
"unknown " used in the old format a portion of the new format's
Economic Factors division (excluding the value for "Bad Profits"
which was considered management related), was taken. Example
Calculations are shown below. All values are taken from the Dun &
Bradstreet excerpts in Appendix D.
Determining the percent of failures attributable to "Unknown"
causes (as listed in the old format of the Dun & Bradstreet
Failure Report from values in the new format).
From D&B Economic Factors Causes Division:
Omitted Bad Profits
0.4 High Interest Rates
7.4 Loss of Market
9.7 No Consumer Spending
9.0 No Futur e
26.5 Total (is percent of D&B Economic Factors Causes
that aren't attributed to management)
Since the Economic Factors Causes Division accounts for 72.8%
of total failures and 26.5 is actually 26.5% of 72.8% the
following calculation is made:
(26.5/100) X (Total of Economic Factors Causes, 72.8%) = 19.3%
But since D&B assigns some failures to more than one cause the
sum of all construction failures for 1987 equals 114.2%. Thus
19.3% corrected for the possibility of double counting is;
19.3% X
114.2% " 100% where X = % Unknown failures
X = 16.9%
Therefore 16.9% of failures would be attributed to Unknown
causes using the old D&B format.







19.4 Total Non-management related causes for 1987
Neglect, Fraud, and Disaster were not factored down since it
is unlikely that they would be double counted.
Table 4.1 shows the actual calculated averages for non-management
and management causes for several years. Not all the data for this
table was locally available, however sufficient data was available
for the purposes of this report. It can be seen from Table 4.1 that
management causes accounted for an average of 91.9 percent of the
total causes prior to 1980. Data beyond 1983, making the
adjustments stated above to allow direct comparison between the
old and new format, shows that the average is more accurately about
80 percent. This finding makes the value of 92 percent normally
used to quantify management related causes for construction firm
failures inaccurate. The earlier simplistic method of reporting
causes is probably the reasons for this discrepancy. Table 4.1 was
also evaluated for trends and except for the increase in "Unknown"
because of the discrepancy discussed above, the values were
relatively constant. This suggests that construction firm failures
attributable to non-management related causes have always been
around 20 percent.
4.2 Economic Indicators
The affect of the national economy on construction activity
is well noted. In almost every article reviewed for this research
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that discussed the health of the construction industry, interest
rates were always mentioned as being of primary concern. New
housing starts increase substantially following lowering of
interest rates. The health of the housing industry is often used
as an economic indicator since it is one of the first industries
affected by changes in the economy. The Federal Reserve's prime
lending rate is considered a short term loan rate. Construction
loans are usually short term variable rate loans. Figure 4.1 which
compares a graph of residential construction activity with the
prime lending rate, shows that each time the prime rate rose
construction activity immediately dropped off. The most extreme
case occurred around 1981 where interest rates rose to an annual
average of about 18 percent and residential construction in place
immediately dropped from about $155 billion to $90 million. The
interest rates of Figure 4.1 are annual averages and thus reflect
more gradual transitions between rates than actually occurred. The
prime rate actually went above 20 percent in 1981. A graph of
interest rates for 30 year new home conventional mortgages and one
for all new home loans reflected profiles similar to that of the
prime rate but were not as prominent. It could be argued that these
conventional mortgage interest rates should be the rates used to
compare to the changes in residential construction activity and not
the prime rate. However, it's the author's opinion that it is more
the general rising of interest rates and not the exact rates
available that stall construction activity. And it is a desire of
this study to look for readily available and easily understood
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Figure 4.1 Residential Const. Activity Compared To Prime Rate
Source: Tables C-6 and C-9
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economic indicators/tools. The added prominence of the prime
lending rate graph is easier read and the prime rate is widely
publicized making it readily available. Also because most other
interest rates react to changes in the Prime Rate, the prime rate
provides the earliest indications of economic problems. Therefore
it is a better early warning sign than other interest rates. The
graphs of "All New Home Conventional Mortgages" and "30 Year New
Home Conventional Mortgages" are provided in Appendix C as Figures
C-6.1 and C-6.2 for the readers review. Further review of Figure
4.1 especially around the year 1966 shows that slight or gradual
increases in interest rates affect residential construction less
severely. Also because of the continual trend of increasing
interest rates, prior to 1981 there does not appear to be a
particular interest rate over which construction activity always
stops or slows as long as interest rates did not rise sharply. This
would suggest interest rates are a relative value based on how long
the consumer has had to accept it as a base rate. When interest
rates rise sharply people naturally are hesitant to buy in hopeful
anticipation of a decrease in interest rates in the near future.
If interest rates stay at a high figure for some length of time
(say at least 18 months from examining Figure 4.1) then the
consumer becomes accustomed to it and is much more likely to
purchase a home. This same phenomenon affects all other
construction in much the same way. The only exception is apparently
governmental spending which isn't as affected by the higher
44
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2interest rates since borrowing is not involved. Generally speaking
however, government spending is reduced during recessionary periods
because of a desire not to increase the national debt.
When interest rates fall and construction activity increases,
marginal contractors enter the field. These new contractors may do
well at first and become overconfident. As higher interest rates
return to the market they reduce activity overall but more so for
the new less well-known firms. These firms fail when the high
interest rates persist . It is generally said high interest rates
affect small construction firms first and more severely than larger
construction firms. This is because the larger firms have a much
larger financial base to draw from. Thus the small guy is much more
susceptible to changes in the economy. As was noted earlier high
interest rates in 1981 considerably reduced the amount of housing
construction which is performed almost exclusively by small
contractors. One advantage the small contractor has is that he is
generally able to recover from financial trouble with little
additional work, where as larger firms may take considerably longer
to recover. Figure 4.2 compares the prime lending rates to
construction firm failures. Construction firm failures tend to
follow the prime rate. As mentioned in Chapter 3 there appears to
be a time lag of about 1 to 2 years before a marked increase of
contractor failures is noticed once an increase in the prime rate
2
. See interview of Mr. Adams Appendix C.
Harlan D. Piatt, Why Companies Fail, Lexington Books,
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occurs. An increase in interest rates is more serious to the
construction industry than most other business since construction
loans are usually only available at a variable interest rate . Thus
a sharp jump in interest rates could rob a contractor of all his
profits if he were in a tough market bidding small profit margins.
Thus large contractors with generally small profit margins (avg
profit = 0.5%) are very susceptible to sharp increases in interest
rates. Also large contractors with new projects or jobs with
substantial time remaining before completion may loose considerable
money due to gradual but substantial rises in interest rates.
However, large contractors generally still have a substantial
financial base to fall back on. If not they will be more
susceptible to interest rates than small firms. An explanation for
the time lag in contractor failures of at least 1 year following
a jump in the prime rate is that it is not the lost profits felt
by contractors due to high interest rates but the lack of projects
to bid on offered by owners. Contractors survive about one year on
their present job inventory but once those jobs are complete there
are no jobs to replace them. Thus construction failures can be a
result of tight money policies by owners. Owners possibly feel they
can get a better return on their money elsewhere.
Bonding companies don't generally use economic indicators such
as the prime rate to govern their decisions to bond or not to bond.
They use economic indicators to estimate the amount of bonding
See interview with Walter Hanke in Appendix A
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2business they should expect . This again would suggest that in poor
economic times construction activity is shut off from the owners
position and contractors can normally survive if they have work.
[Barnette 1989] stated "no work" as the favorite reason
contractors give for failing.
A national rise in oil prices would tend to have similar
effects upon construction firms as do interest rates since as oil
prices go up so does almost everything else. Oil prices differ from
interest rates in that a sharp increase would affect heavy
construction contractors the most. This is because of the large
amounts of fuel and oil required to keep their equipment running.
Thus heavy construction contractors should keep close tabs on oil
prices as well as interest rates.
An indicator that may help contractors in predicting wage
increases is the unemployment rate. According to the [SBA 89] if
unemployment rates get below 4 percent there is a general trend for
wages to increase. Therefore, unemployment rates can be important
in a contractor's business plan or even in the estimating of a
project. Contractors should watch the unemployment rate for their
local area as well as the national unemployment rate since they
may vary considerably. An indicator to watch for office builders
is the office vacancy rate. At the end of 1988 the national office
vacancy rate was 21.4 percent indicating the country has over built
in that area."" Contractors specializing in office building are in
"Outlook 89", ENR, 19 Jan 1989, pp 54.
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for lean times unless diversified enough to take up the slack in
other fields such as hospital construction. Hospital construction
is apparently a growing field because of the aging of America.
Demographic figures are worth watching as well. The housing
industry will be hard hit in the near future as the number of
Americans aged 25 to 34, the group most likely to be first time
home buyers, will fall from 43.3 million in 1987 to 36.3 million
in the year 2000.^
4.3 Government Spending
The Federal Reserve Board's tight money policies hit harder
at small firms than at large ones. This is because the debt/equity
ratio for small firms tends to be greater than for large firms,
particularly in manufacturing, construction, and distributive
trades . In economic downturns the government as an owner also
reduces its construction spending which in turn contributes to
contractor failures. A very interesting study done in 1981
suggests that the government should investment into public works
construction at the onset of recessionary periods to act as a
counter-cyclical measure for stabilizing the economy. Public works
investments account for a substantial part of construction
"What's Pulling The Rug Out From Under Housing", Business
Week, 23 Jan 1989, pp 104.
SBA office of the Advocacy, Economic Research On Small
Business: The Environment For Entrepreneurship And Small Business,
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981, p.iv.
Choate and Walter, America In Ruins, 1983.
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activity. Of the $223 billion in new construction put in place in
1980, over $56.7 billion was for public works. This is more than
25 percent of the total US construction investment. Public works
construction expenditures not only directly affect construction
firms but also the service companies that construction firms need
in order to operate such as equipment and material suppliers. The
study discusses the poor condition of the nations present
infrastructure and the substantial shortfall in annual investments
toward its modernization and expansion required to meet the
increasing needs of the country. It states that public works
investment has long been made in a pro-cyclical manner, increasing
during the expansion phase of an economical cycle and decreasing
during the contractionary phase, thus worsening the recession.
Since 1960 Congress has enacted three public works counter-cyclical
programs the $1.9 billion dollar Accelerated Public Works Program
in 1961-1962, the $130 billion dollar Public Works Impact Program
in 1972-1973, and the $6 billion dollar Local Public Works Impact
Program in 1976-1977. All of these programs fell short of their
goal because it took so much time to pass legislation to start and
then implement them. Eighty percent of the direct employment
created by the Local Public Works Impact Program did not occur
until the recovery phase of the period. Also the programs were to
narrow in scope. Using the stabilizing effects of public works
investment at the beginning of a recession could lessen the
increased chance of construction firm failures. This would take
considerable planning and coordination by federal, state, and local
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governments. It would represent very beneficial legislation for the
construction industry and should be pursued by both large and small
construction associations.
Small business has a disadvantaged position compared with
large firms in the regulatory process and thus lacks key influence.
For example 90 federal agencies with regulatory powers issue around
7,000 new rules each year . These rules appear in the Federal
Register which is generally not read by the small business
community. Thus small business generally misses the chance to
respond within the required time. Changing tax laws are always a
concern of contractors especially when involving equipment
depreciation. Local legislation can also be a problem. A good
example of detrimental regional legislation is occurring in Oregon.
Legislation is being voted on that would prevent contractors from
bidding on state jobs valued less than $250,000 dollars. Not
surprisingly, the bill is being sponsored by the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.
4.4 The Cost o f Doing Business
In the middle 1960's construction costs in general began to
accelerate. From a predictable 5 percent a year costs rose to 7
then 9 and then 10 percent per year. Costs more than doubled during
the 1970's and are still rising. Labor has out distanced costs,
and demands for 15, 20, and 25 percent wage increases per year were
SBA 81, Economic Research On Small Bxisiness: The Environment




not uncommon . Housing costs increased to the point of driving
prospective buyers to "packaged houses" and "mobile homes". Yet,
contractors by adopting assembly-line methods succeeded in turning
out houses which in price represented less than half the increases
in unit labor costs where hand labor is used*'. The cost of
performing the everyday functions of a construction firm and
purchasing the needed materials for projects are things not
completely controllable by management. The costs associated with
employee benefits are rising at exorbitant rates. The steep rise
in employee compensation throughout the construction industry is
reflected in Figure 4.3. This
graph shows the sharp increases
in employee compensation that
contractors have had to deal -
with over the years. Many
contractors have found *
themselves seriously in the red
due to surprisingly high
benefit costs. Of 21 states
that granted wage hikes from
October 1988 to March 1989
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
EMPL OTF F COMPE NSAT I ON
Figure 4.3
Source: Table C-8
eight were in the double digit range. The highest was in Florida
at 28.8 percent. As noted in Chapter 3, Dun & Bradstreet attributed
many construction failures to heavy operating expenses as a result
:c Frein, p. 34
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of spiraling prices and wages, A possible explanation for these
failures is that in general the construction industry does not
adequately incorporate inflation into their bids. This is
understandable since contractors are trying to under bid their
competitors and a contractor with a large estimate of inflation
although more adequate may lose the bid. v •
•
The additional paperwork required when performing contract
work for the federal, state, or local government is estimated to
add a cost of about $1,270 dollars to an average small business.*"
The volume of paperwork required for SBA loans makes them
essentially inaccessible to many firms. Government regulations in
general are more costly to small business. It costs a small
business of less than 50 employees seven to tens times as much to
comply with government regulations than it costs a larger business
with 50 to 250 employees*'. A single IRS form was reported by
Employer's Quarterly Tax Report as costing each small business an
average of $488.00 to prepare.
Legal costs and the number of construction related cases are
rising rapidly. The membership of the American Bar Association's
Forum Committee on the Construction Industry has doubled in size
in the last 4 years to 4000 attorneys . Similarly the number of
** SBA, Government Paperwork and Small Business, 197 9.
SBA, The Environment For Entrepreneurship And Small
Business, 1981, p.iv.
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construction cases handled by the American Arbitration Association
has been rising by about 10 percent per year for a number of years.
More than 90 percent of all construction disputes are settled
before they go to court, but they still cost plenty in legal fees.
Construction lawyers, once considered to be the dregs of legal
specializations are now the envy of the legal profession because
of their earning potential , Today with the volume of lawsuits in
the field and the number of multimillion dollar awards, lawyers are
getting into the field as fast as they can. Legal fees run between
$75 to $200 dollars an hour.*' Many small construction firms are
hiring lawyers and making them part of their full time staff.
Construction lawyers say firms can save themselves major money by
investing in a half hours phone call to a construction lawyer at
the onset of a problem. Also lawyers suggest that their use up-
front negotiating better contracts can prevent legal heartaches
later. One way suggested to win disputes is to keep good records
and document everything. Numerous construction law seminars are
being conducted regularly around the country on every aspect of
construction law. These seminars are well attended and have even
been criticized by some as fueling the flames of litigation in the
construction industry because they teach people how to go about
litigation. Small businesses are frequently at an economic
disadvantage because they can't afford the legal and accounting
help they need. Much of the small firm's management time must be
spent keeping up with changes in tax laws and other government
regulations. Large businesses generally have a staff assigned to
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keeping the company current with new tax laws or other federal or
state regulations.
4.5 Regional Affects
Construction companies located in a single commodity region
have a much higher chance for failure than the average firm. This
is because if the regions bread winning commodity falters the money
in the region dries up. New construction is no longer needed and
even public works maintenance is deferred due to lack of tax
dollars. This was most evident in the oil producing states such as
Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana that were hit so hard when the
petroleum industry sustained substantial losses in the early 70's.
A large number of contractors failed with the petroleum companies.
In the near future water limitations and the accompanied higher
costs for water may change the economic climate of Arizona, Nevada,
and Southern California. That region may soon lose some of its
major industry because of rising water prices. When industry leaves
along with it goes tax base that funds government construction and
home buyers required by the housing industry.
A worry of contractors branching out into regions of the
country they are unfamiliar with is regional costs. For instance
in the New England area the cost of solid waste collection and
disposal is two and one-half times the national average* . The
additional cost for disposal of trash, unusable waste, and other
SBA 81, The Environment For Ent repreneurship and Small
Business, 1981, p. 51
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debris on a construction site may devour the entire expected profit
of a contractor who did not consider this additional cost. A
regional cost that should be considered when establishing- a
construction firm is the local tax burden. It may vary widely from
state to state. The tax burden for a business may be significantly
less a few miles away in a neighboring state. Thus the state and
its tax laws can have a major impact upon business profits.
4.6 Technical Complexity, Warranty, High P r ofil e
The increasing complexity of construction today was mentioned
by all the surety industry people interviewed as an increasing
cause for construction defaults. Contractors due to the nature of
their business and the way contracts are written are generally
responsible for building the A & E's design such that it works just
like it is supposed to despite a few design flaws here and there.
Since owners and A 6> E's write the contracts, they naturally desire
to shift as much liability as possible to the contractor. If
something doesn't work properly generally the contractor is blamed.
The contractor in the bidding process is betting a lot of his
profits on the abilities of the A & E. Considerable litigation has
occurred rising from disputes over which party is responsible for
a workable design. The contractor blames the A & E for poor design
and the A S E blames the contractor for poor construction.
Extended warranties desired by owners are specified more often
today and pose a new problem to the construction industry.
Contractors may enter into contracts that specify long warranties
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because they need the work and fell if they perform the work
correctly the warranty will pose no problem. However, installation
of specified materials using exact and proper methods may not be
enough. Unless the contractor knows all the possible uses of the
facility, the various loadings, weathering, and environmental
extremes that the materials will be subject to, he is gambling with
his financial future when agreeing to long term warranties.
High profile jobs face a different type of problem. The
constructabi 1 i ty of a project may not be of concern but delays
caused by actions of special interest groups can complicate things
considerably. Projects can become delayed for indefinite periods
of time leaving the contractor asking himself what to do next.
Should he pull his equipment and manpower off the job at
considerable expense and work on another job, or will the conflict
be solved quickly allowing him to go back to work. Which is the
least costly to his company? Delay clauses seldom cover all the
costs incurred by a contractor. The contractor needs to be working
on jobs that provide him a profit and delay clauses never provide
that.
4.7 Financial Institutions
The failure of several S & L's despite government actions to
save them have recently caused defaults on construction projects"'.
Contractors have been left without any money right in the middle
See interview with Jack Adams in Appendix A
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of projects. Other financial institutions not familiar with a
contractor or his project don't want to all of a sudden buy into
part of a project in order to keep the contractor solvent. Thus the
contractors must turn to the bonding company to save them or they
will default and the bonding company will have to take over the
job. Because of the failure of several S & L's and some banks,
surety companies are now looking into the financial condition of
the bank or S & L financing the project before bonding the
contractor*".
The lack of risk capital and credit was continuously found as
a problem that increases the probability of failure.
"Construction firm failures which contributed most heavily to
the upsurge in liabilities between 1965 and 1966 pinpointed
most acutely the squeeze of tight money." [Dun & Brad66]
When credit is available to small firms often it is at a cost that
prohibits a sufficient rate of return to make a project profitable.
Credit for the small construction firm is generally at a higher
interest rate than for larger firms. This difference in interest
rates make the small firm less competitive with large business.
Beginning firms generally rely on informal sources of funds
to get their businesses off the ground such as personal savings,
loans from relatives or friends, and business associates. This is
primarily because financial institutions require some sort of
attractive business credit history before approving a loan and
aren't generally willing to finance new businesses. This tight
money policy by financiers, although sensible, is perhaps one of
the major reasons for failure in young construction firms. A small
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firm may have enough money to last one year and finally see a
profit, only to find out that failure is eminent due to no
borrowing power. Once a firm has been in operation for a few years
and venture capital is needed for expansion such as for equipment,
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general contractors are financial ly more stable than subcontractors
because general contractors are closer to the source of money. And
that general contractors have a lower failure rate. Sureties and
banks make subcontractors meet much tougher financial requirements
than general contractors. In fact most surety companies prefer not
to bond subcontractors and generally refuse to bond sub-
subcontractors. According to the Dun & Bradstreet failure rates
given in Table 3.1 general contractors fail about the same or more
than subs and specialty contractors. The misconception that general
contractors fail less often than subs and specialty contractors may
be a result of the large number of subs and specialty contractors
that have failed since about 1981. Figure 4.4 can be misleading.
The widening of the failure gap for general contractors and other
contractors is simply a result of an increase in the number of
specialty contractors and the corresponding proportionate number
of failures. The increased number of specialty contractors may be
a result of the increasing complexity in today's construction.
Therefore the surety industry may think the failure rate of general
contractors is less than for subs but they are not considering it
proportionately for the number of subs and specialty contractors
in existence.
Different contractor specialties tend to do better than others
according to surety personnel interviewed. Contractors in less
complex fields such as paving and concrete work were mentioned as
generally being more stable. Contractors in more complex fields
such as electrical and industrial piping seemed to fail more often
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than the average. Two reasons were given for a perceived high
failure rate for roofers. One was their warranting of roof jobs for
very long times. Another was the high probability that the roofing
contractor had learned the business from the bottom up but never
received any formal business and accounting training. Therefore
they do not have the financial or accounting tools to survive long.
4.9 Personnel
The high turnover rate inherent in the construction industry
is a fact of life. Construction companies hire more part-time
employees than most other industries. They hire the very young,
very old, transient, and much unskilled labor . The cost to train
and develop these employees is tremendous. Low retention rates are
costly through the added overhead they require. To properly process
the required paper work associated with employees as they come and
go, places additional burden on contractors. Worker turnover for
small firms is especially costly because it directly diverts
management's attention from productive activities. Liability costs
are continually increasing. Personnel safety is becoming more and
more of an issue at considerable cost to the contractor. Employees
must be trained and certified to perform certain functions or the
company chances fines by OSHA. Labor costs have increased 10 fold
since 1940. Workman's Compensation and other liability costs have
skyrocketed. This year construction industry unemployment reached




a nine year low. According to the Construction Labor Research
Council (CLRC), a Washington DC research organization, the
construction industry will need 210,000 new workers annually
through the mid 1990 's. Replacement needs exceed growth needs by
two-and-a-half to one*'. Because of the economic law of supply and
demand wages will surely increase substantially as contractors
compete for workers.
4.10 Death of Owne r
Death of the firm's owner is almost always followed by the
firm's failure according to the surety personnel interviewed. This
is despite continuation plans and other insurance protection that
are available. Most surety companies and the SBA require
continuation plans before they will bond a contractor. Death of a
firm's owner is not a frequent problem but significant enough to
worry surety agents. The Surety Group with its approximately 150
contractor clients generally experiences 1 owner death per year" .
Death of other key individuals in a construction firm is a concern
and is the reason for key man insurance. However, their death does
not typically result in eventual company failure. These people can
generally be replaced as long as the strong guidance of the owner
is still there. Turnover of key individuals is not necessarily a
problem either since when a company is doing well the employees
will stick around to enjoy the prosperity. It is when the company
Per Mr. Barnette of the Surety Group, see Appendix A
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is going down hill that employees start looking for other jobs.*





5. 1 Results and Conclusions
From the information gathered in this research it is apparent
that the forces up against today's contractors are substantial.
Non-management related contractor failures not normally dealt with
in other research, has proven to be very interesting and
encompasses a broad range of topics. A contractor, knowing what
external forces he must deal with in the vast and complex
construction markets of today will have a distinct advantage over
most other contractors. Obviously being a good manager is more
important than watching the prime rate to predict lean times.
However, watching the prime rate may provide substantial dividends
in the long run. Through proper planning and better informed
decisions, contractors can develop stronger and more resistant
firms to market fluctuations.
Probably the three most significant findings by this study
were: 1) that a much larger percent of construction firm failures,
approximately 20 percent, occur due to non-management causes than
originally thought, 2) that construction firm failures lag
increases in the prime rate by about 1 year and 3) that subs and
specialty contractors do not fail at a greater rate than general
contractors. The first two findings should encourage contractors




The basic lessons from this research are as follows:
Dun and Bradstreet says business vulnerability varies by
industry, size, age, geographically and year. From this study the
most significant non-management causes for failure are felt to be;
1. Economic Downturns (Escalating Interest Rates)
2. Escalating Costs
3. Technical Complexity and Warranty
4. Regional Differences/Major Commodity Failures
5. Death of Owner
Contractors should keep their eye on economic trends. Perhaps
a welcome addition to Mr. Frein's description of the ideal
contractor quoted in Chapter 1 would be "economist". A contractor
who adjusts his business plan to react to economic changes will
probably survive longer and realize bigger profits. The prime rate
and ENR's cost indexes are probably the most beneficial tools for
planing. Contractor's must react to changing market conditions
before the market hurts their companies, not when damage is done.
As profit margins are reduced in economic slumps, contractors
should be prepared to make tough decisions to reduce their
overhead. One tough decision is laying people off. Start with the
ones most likely to leave anyway, if possible. This may be the best
procedure since you want to make sure the ones you keep will not
leave and add to the high cost of turning over personnel. Inflation
should always be considered in bids. However, inflation is seldom
adequately considered in competitive bids because of the notion
that other contractors may not be including as much inflation as
you are. Only in negotiated contracts could inflation be properly
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accounted for. A way inflation could be properly considered in a
competitively bid job would be for owners to routinely specify an
adequate value to be used in all bids. This is highly unlikely
since there is no motivation for the owner to do this. He would
essentially be increasing the cost of his project. It would
strengthen the contractor making him less likely to default which
would benefit the owner.
If at all possible contractors should not operate a
construction business within a region dependent upon a single
commodity for survival. If by chance that commodity becomes
obsolete or no longer in demand money for any type of construction
will be scarce. Without work no construction company can survive.
If a contractor must locate within such a region he should not
concentrate his work in that immediate area. Contract for jobs well
outside the region if possible to insulate from regional economics.
Subs should try to receive their progress payments directly
from the owner. Whether general contractors fail at a lower rate
than subs or not is not that important. What is important is that
general contractors are closer to the money than subs and this fact
has to strengthen their position. "Construction Management" type
of contracting, where the owner deals directly with the
subcontractors would be the safest situation for sub-contractors.
Contractors should be more aware of the unknowns inherent in there
type of construction. Sewer and pipe contractors fail more often
than others because of the great amount of uncertainty they deal
with in soil conditions. They are also greatly affected by weather
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and the dangers of working in trenches. A contractor with the
diversity of doing renovation and remodeling would be more stable
during economic downturns. As money dries up renovation of old
buildings will be chosen over building new ones. Also the
tremendous amount of construction in place is getting older and
reaching the age of renovation in the normal building life cycle.
Also government tends to renovate because maintenance funds are
easier to get than new construction funds.
Negotiate for contracts when possible in attempt to keep
profits within a comfortable range for dealing with the unknown.
Bidding doesn't usually allow consideration of the unknown and thus
economic downturns are more harmful
.
The construction industry as a whole should lobby for counter-
cyclical public works legislation that would invoke added
investment by the government at the beginning of recessionary
periods. This would help stabilize the national economy as well as
make the construction industry a more stable industry. To plan and
implement such legislation would be a momentous undertaking and a
tremendous backlog of construction would be required.
To combat failure of a company due to death of the owner,
clear and concise continuation plans must be developed. The people
of the company must feel confident in the abilities of the
relieving manager. The transition must be quick and show clear
direction. To ensure the death of a key individual in the firm does
not substantially affect a company, key man insurance should be
purchased. Key individuals can take a lot of critical corporate
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knowledge with them and the company stands to lose a lot while it
is filling in the missing pieces. General management succession
planning should also be used for such management contingencies as
illness, injury, and retirement.
Construction firms need to be well informed and have easy
access to industry information. Some of the more important
information needs are financial ratios of other similar type firms,
costs and sources of borrowing, general economic forecasts for the
coming year and a summary interpretation of government regulations
affecting construction firms. The most likely agency to do this
would be the SBA
.
Contracting is and always will be a demanding and rewarding
but unforgiving profession. It demands experience, sometimes
acquired at heartbreaking costs. It demands the full attention of
an alert imaginative mind. Construction problems constantly change.
The problems of the 1940's and 1950's were not the same as the
1970's or 1980's. Contractors must learn to develop and change with
the times and most of all anticipate change and adjust to it as
fast as it occurs, not after it has happened.
Fraud, neglect and disaster were not discussed in previous
chapters but are important. Insurance to protect against natural
disaster and fraud should always be purchased. Personal problems
resulting in neglect by the owner should not be over looked. The





5.2 A Failure Prevention Guide
The following is a series of statements and questions intended
to act as a guide in the prevention of contractor failures due to
problems external to management. The guide does not pretend to be
totally comprehensive nor does it suggest that a firm following
these guidelines will survive all pitfalls and be successful.
Successful contractors are not created in a day or by the
successful completion of one or two contracts. Many contractors
have had to fight their way back to the top, sometimes more than
once. The really successful ones are molded by years of experience.
The fact that in 1986 thirty percent of the failed construction
companies were between 6 and 10 years old suggests that
construction firms may not be well established until well after 10
years in business.
Contractors should consider the following questions and statements:
1. Purchase substantial life insurance on owners and all key
personnel. This is particularly important for individual operators,
solely owned corporations, and partnerships.
2. Do you have people you don't know very well in key
financial positions? Keep your organization compact and intact.
Know your people well and watch for signs of fraud and
embezzlement. Fraud or embezzlement may bankrupt your business.
3. Stay out of disputes and lawsuits whenever possible.




cheaper. Also credit reporting agencies always note the number of
lawsuits, attachments and judgments recorded against contractors.
Surety companies and banks always receive copies of these reports.
A history of litigation may scare away bankers and surety agents.
An arbitration clause or other effective means of settling disputes
should be specified in any construction contract entered into.
4. Recognize your surety agent, insurance agent, and banker
as integral parts of your organization. Consult with them
regularly. They all want you to succeed and can provide valuable
assistance.
5. Keep in the direct flow of money from the owner. If you
are a general contractor this is no problem but, if you are a
subcontractor this may be very difficult. Try to contract directly
with owners as a prime contractor. As a prime your work may still
be scheduled and coordinated by the general but you are paid
directly by the owner. This reduces delays in receiving your money,
and loss of your money through default by the general.
6. Ensure all construction contracts you enter into have a
changed condition clause as a general condition that requires the
owner to pay for the unexpected. The owner should not be the
arbiter of whether the unexpected has occurred and the contract
should state that it is based on an assumed/described set of facts.
7. When the prime rate goes up prepare for difficult times
immediately. If economist predict that interest rates are going
high and will stay there a while, selling equipment and laying off





8. Other indicators should be watched such as unemployment and
inflation to adjust bidding strategies accordingly.
5.3 Recommendation s For Future Work
During the course of this research several encounters with
very interesting facts and topics occurred. One very interesting
study found late in the development of this paper, was one done by
Contractor Profit News, A short magazine article (provided in
Appendix B as correspondence from the Surety Association of
America) discussing the study provided several very interesting
facts. The study contains data on 183 firms throughout the country.
For future studies concerning contractor failures, profitability,
productivity, and union statistics this would most likely be a very
helpful source. The complete study is available from Contractor
Profit News, 10 Midland Ave., Newton, MA 02158. The cost for the
full report is $95 prepaid.
A book recommended from the AGC on construction failures is
"A Contractors Survival Guide" written by Thomas C. Schleifer. Mr.
Schleifer was a contractor that did so well at taking over troubled
construction companies and making them profitable or helping firms
get back on their feet, that he quit contracting and salvaged
construction companies full time. He later became a national
speaker for the AGC on construction firm failures. He is now a
professor at East Carolina University in Greenville North Carolina.
His address for a future reference is 2 Upton Court, Greenville,
North Carolina 27858-8530. The publishing company of his book is
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Asian Press, 6731 Curran St., McClean, Virginia 22101.
An issue that was not dealt with much was the influence of
government policy on small construction firms. Most articles just
mention it but never evaluated it very closely.
A computer game called CONSTRUCTS could be a very informative
modeling or simulation tool for new or experienced construction
managers. The game is project oriented and has been developed to
give the manager an environment in which he can experience to some
degree the dynamics of project management. It is designed to
present the manager with realistic data projections that form the
basis of decision making to control cost and time. CONSTRUCTO
confronts the player with simulated situations described in terms
of environmental and economic parameters and places him in the
position of being in charge of a construction project. Weather,
economics, and productivity are all used by the program to develop
the construction environment. Network or critical path diagrams are
used to represent the project model . This game could perhaps be
evaluated to determine its true educational value. Perhaps an
entire course could be developed around this computer program
allowing students to experience through simulation the effects of
the marketplace upon a construction project. The students could
perhaps learn the thought processes required to keep a construction
project from default.
* CONSTRUCTO is a heuristic game for construction by Halpin
' and Woodhead. The description of the came was found in the text
I.
^
Financial & Cost Concepts for Construction Management by Daniel W.
Halpin, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985, p. 319.
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A professor Bernard L. Webb of the Georgia State University
Department of Risk Management and Insurance, phone (404) 651-2733,
has recently completed or nearly completed a study on bonding of
minority construction firms. His study must deal with firm failures
and may be a good source for anyone looking at that particular
segment of construction firms.
Another possibly helpful text on construction failures is
entitled "Construction Failures". It was described in a packet of
book descriptions mailed to my home by Wiley Professional Books-
By-Mail. It may be another good source for anyone interested in
continuing the research of this paper. The book publisher's address
is John Wiley and Sons Inc., Department 063, One Wiley Drive,
Somerset New Jersey, 08875-9977. It was edited by Robert F.
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Following are 6 interview summaries. The interviews were
conducted informally between the author and the person named.
Attempt was made to allow the persons being interviewed to discuss
whatever they felt relevant to the topic however, sometimes
questions were used (in no particular order) to spur conversation.
Some interviews were conducted over the telephone as individuals
called in response to correspondence mailed to them, A copy of all
correspondence resulting from this study is provided in Appendix
B followed by any written response or applicable material received




Date: 28 August 1989
Interviewed: Mr. Ray Barnette
The Surety Group, Inc.
1706 Defoor PL NW
Atlanta, Georgia
(404) 352-8211
Mr. Barnette is an independent insurance and surety bond agent
with a construction firm clientele of over 150, He routinely deals
with construction firm problems and was very helpful and willing
to discuss the topic of construction firm failures with me. Note
that his company sales surety bonds, but insurance underwriters
that review the contractors financial condition must approve each
sale.
The following is a summary of Mr. Barnette's comments when
asked what he felt from his experience were major reasons not
controllable by a firm's management that a small construction firm
might f ai 1
.
1. As interest rates increase the market draws up lessening the
amount of work available. Thus more people are bidding on less work
and the competitiveness gets fierce. Profit margins are lowered and
their is no cushion for mistakes. The quickest way to get the
economy going again is to reduce interest rates.
Another problem with interest rates occurred in the late 70's
to early 80's. During this period interest rates were very high and
the insurance industry as a whole lowered their requirements and
premiums to gain more capital for investing. The high interest
rates were so attractive to the insurance industry that they were
more interested in getting their premiums than keeping troubled
jobs going. This caused several failures. Also surety is only 1.5
percent of the insurance industry, so the insurance industry was
not very concerned with impacts to the construction industry. In
1985-87 the interest rates went back down and surety underwriters
instantly tightened up on the availability of surety bonds.
2. The level of spending by the government can also cause problems.
If there is a drop in spending in a particular area of construction
such as highways, defense, or public works that particular field
of construction draws tighter and profit margins are reduced to get
jobs .
3. Small construction firms tend to fail quicker in difficult times
than large firms do however they tend to bounce back quicker when
construction picks back up,
4. Not out of the control of the firms management is a frequent and
significant problem, refusal to reduce overhead. In hard times as
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the number of jobs drop off contractors traditionally refuse to
layoff employees. A contractors favorite saying when asked why he
failed is, "there wasn't enough work". When asked why didn't he cut
his overhead he generally states, "I thought I was going to get
that job". Therefore failure to react to changing market conditions
can cause failures.
5. Technical complexity is becoming a serious problem. Sometimes
jobs are so complex that you can be a very good contractor but fail
due to the "complexity factor". A lot of unknowns exist in many new
types of designs specified by engineers and architects. Contractors
are generally held accountable for more than their share of the
design's success. Contractors just can't be expected to solve all
of the architect's and engineer's problems. There has been a lot
of litigation in this area.
6. Long term warranties are a relatively new contract stipulation
that owners want which are causing construction firm failures.
Surety companies generally will not even bond jobs with long term
warranties. The problem occurs when a contractor such as a roofing
contractor agrees to a 5 year roof warranty, installs the roof
according to plans, specifications, and inspections and the roof
goes bad at 4 1/2 years. The contractor must then spend
considerable amounts of his own funds to put the roof back into
working order even though it was installed properly.
7. Death of the firm's owner generally results in the firm's
failure. We average about one death a year out of 150 construction
firms. Contractors don't plan for their deaths and new management
generally can't seem to management the firm as well as the original
owner. Bonding companies usually require continuation plans with
group coverage and key man insurance.
8. A banks refusal to lend money can cause a construction firm to
fail. If a contractor has a job going and needs more money to
finish the job he may not be able to get it. His credit rating may
change during the course of a job and prevent him from future
borrowing and possibly cause default. Or it may cause inability to
bid on a needed job.
Below are comments when asked what type of contractors fail
more often than others.
9. General contractors generally do better than all others because
they are closer to the money source. Money passes to the general
contractor first then flows down to the subs. Also they have less
people on their payroll. Surety companies and banks are very hard
on subcontractors. They must have a much better credit history than
the generals.
10. Sewer and water contractors, roofing contractors, and swimming
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pool contractors tend to be the riskiest. Concrete contractors are
generally a good bet.
11. Sewer and water contractors have problems because they are
subject to a lot more unknowns than others. They are highly
affected by the weather and have a lot of problems with safety. The
pollution people are always after them. And the complexity of
piping systems in plants is a real nightmare.
12. Roofing contractors have a high failure rate because they have
generally come up through the ranks as a roofer and not had the
proper business and managerial training needed to successfully run
a business. They are not technically knowledgeable enough to stay
up with and utilize the new products. And engineers and architects
continually specify new unfamiliar types of roofs.
Mr. Barnette suggested the following as other sources of
inf ormat i on
:
a. Mr. Gene Merriday
Small Business Administration, Surety Bond Manager for
this Region. 347-2441
b. Lynn Brown
Small Business Administration , Surety Bond Mgr . for Georgia
c. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
Mr. Jack Adams
399-5645
d. US Fidelity & Guarantee
e. Continental Insurance Group




Date: 30 August 1989
Interviewed: Walter Hanke
Small Business Administration






Mr. Hanke is the SBA ' s regional surety bond coordinator. He
routinely deals with construction firm problems/failures and was
very helpful in providing additional sources of information. He
provided the attached list of default codes and checklist for nev;
accounts used by the SBA. The SBA surety bond fact sheet that
follows the checklist came from an information packet the SBA
provides when someone inquires about their assistance programs.
Mr. Hanke's chose not to speculate very much as to the reasons
for non-management construction firm failures except for the
following, while reviewing the SBA default code.
1. Bad Weather, lasting longer than normally expected can cause
serious problems when a construction contract includes stiff
penalty clauses for delay.
2. Embezzlement by employees has placed many small companies in
financial difficulties and even to fail.
3. Illness and death is also a problem when it involves the owner
but to combat against this problem the SBA requires continuation
plans as mentioned in number 16 of the attached checklist for new
accounts
.
4. Increasing interest rates cause contractors serious financial
problems since most construction loans are at a variable rate, not
fixed like restaurants and other businesses are able to get.
The following is a list of additional sources suggested by
Mr. Hanke:
a. Surety Association Of America











The American Surety Association








Grant Thornton, Accountant & Management Consultants
2300 Gas Light Tower
Atlanta, GA 30303-1499
(404) 688-7195
SBA Surety Bond Claims Office




Barbara Racine, Claims Manager
or Bob Johnson, Underwriting Manager
Georgia State University
Department of Risk Management S. Insurance
University Plaza
Bernard L Webb












DEFALT CODES - REASON FOR DEF/iULT




3. Shortage In critical materials/delays 1n receiving same
4. Alleged embezzlement
5. Financial mi smanagejnent
6. Incompetence/poor workmanshi p
7. Union strike/labor trouble
8. Illness or death of key employee
9. Walked off job
10. Dispute with obligee
11. Possible fraudulent operation on part of principal
12. Despondency
13. Co-mingling of funds
14. General's subcontractor In default
15. Sub's general in default
16. Possible sub-busting on part of general
17. IRS lien
18. Sub's general behind schedule
19. Unforseen physical obstacle
20. Shortage of labor
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CHECKLIST FOR NEW ACCOUNT
TO ALL PARTICIPATIHG SDRBTIES
When submitting a new application, the following information is required:
Please forward a copy of this memo with items checked.
] 1. Forms 994 [ ) 994B [ ) 994P [ ] 990 ( ) 912 [ ] 1261 ( ] SBA Pees [ )
] 2. General Agreement of Idemnity.
] 3. Signed and dated financial statements for past 3 years P/E. Current
P/S to be within 90 days if last Y/B is not. Tax return-, when
requested .
] 4 Signed and dated current personal financial statements.
]5. AffiliatedPinancialStatements.
] 6. Subordination Agreements.
] 7. Letters of funding in instance of Public Body, Church, Public
School, etc.
] 8. Letters from suppliers concerning credit ability.
] 9. Credit Report of applicants for jobs exceeding $250,000.
] 10. Letter from past Obligees concerning performance and c-'pacity of
contractor.
] 11. Pull resumes of past training and working history of Officers, Owner:
Partners.
] 12. Copy of Bid Invitation/Contract. Bond oust be required by these
documents.
I 13. Letter froa bank of account concerning balances of checking account,
current loan position (including collateralized and line of credit)
and bank's general statement concerning contractor.
] 14. Letter of r ecoua^nda
t
ion from Agent stating why bond cannot be issued
without SBA assistance and results of prior surety checks.
) 15. If jolJt venture, copy of formal joint venture agreement.
] 16. Business Plan is required for all new contractors. Plan to include:
A summary of the contractors growth to the present, his plans for
business activity for the next 12 month and a description of
Management experience and continuity provision.
Thank you for your cooperation.





WHAT DOES SBA GUARANTEE ?
SEA is not authorized to issue direct bonds. Bonds must be issued by a Surety
and SBA participates by a guarantee up to 80 percent of any loss incurred by a
surety company as a result of their issuance of a bond.
CONTRACT SIZE LIMITATION
Individual contracts of $1,250,000 or less are eligible for SBA's bond guarantee.
There is no limit to the number of bonds that can be guaranteed for any one
contractor.
ELIGIBILITY - SNIALL BUSINESS AND BONDS
Determination of whether an applicant is eligible with respect to the SBA size
standards shall be in accordance with 13 CFR Part 121.4(h)(2) of SBA's published
Rules and Regulations . Some suppliers such as fabricators, are under other
categories of 13 CFR and this will have to be determined by the SBA Slirety Bond
Office. Gross receipts cannot exceed $3,500,000 averaged over the past three
contractor's fiscal years. The bond situation must be covered in the Contract
Section of the Surety Association of America Rating Manual. The bond must be
required in the contract.
WHO CAN BENEFIT
The Surety Bond Guarantee Program can benefit any small business that is required
to have a bid, performance, or payment bond in order to obtain a contract;
including, but not limited to, firms in construction, service and supply work.
HOW TO APPLY
Applicant contacts a participating Agent for their determination of whether they
will issue the bond direct or request SBA participation. Should applicant not
be able to locate an Agent who participates in the Surety Bond Guarantee Program,
contact with the nearest SBA Surety Bond Office may be made for participating
Agents in your area. All necessary Underwriting will be done by the Agent.
This will include current financial, performance and other operating capabilities,
COST
All final bond applications, and all bid bonds resulting in awards, require
a processing fee of $6.00 per thousand dollars of the contract face value.
NOTE: CONTRACT, NOT BOND AMOUNT . The processing fee is paid by the contractor.
In the event of cancellation, or if for some reason the bond is not issued,
the processing fee will be returned. When the bond is issued, the contractor
will pay the Surety company's bond premium. This charge cannot exceed
1.8% ($18.00 per thousand) of the contract amount.
WHAT HELP SBA CAN PROVIDE
Counseling is available on request from our Office of Management Assistance,
SCORE Program, and our Minority Small Business personnel. This assistance may
be requested from the SBA District Office serving your area.

INTERVIEW SUMMARY
Date: 28 August 1989
Interviewed: Mr. Jack Adams
Fidelity And Deposit Company of Maryland
900 Ashwood Parkway, Dunwoody (Wang Bldg.)
Atlanta, GA
(404) 399-5645
Mr. Adams is surety bond manager for Fidelity and Deposit
which is a large insurance underwriter. He routinely deals with
construction firm problems and was very helpful and willing to
discuss the topic of construction firm failures with me. Fidelity
and Deposit sells surety bonds directly to the contractors and also
underwrites to independent surety agents.
The following is a summary of Mr. Adams's comments when asked
various questions.
Question: What from his experience were major reasons not
controllable by a firm's management that a small construction firm
might fail
.
1. Something not controllable by a firms management that has
recently been a growing problem is default by Savings & Loans and
even banks. Several Savings S> Loans have been declared insolvent
with which contractors had loans leaving the contractors with no
money right in the middle of a project. This only affects the
public sector jobs since this would not be a problem with
government jobs. This has caused bonding companies to begin looking
into the financial condition of the lending institution before
issuing a bond.
Question: Are there are any general indicators they use to adjust
their bonding strategy such as watching the prime lending rate or
government spending?
2. The prime rate shouldn't affect a job once it is underway.
Economic indicators are used primarily for planing purposes to
predict the amount of business to expect. Not as a means to reduce
or increase the amount of bonding provided. No money can be made
with surety bonds if they aren't selling them. And there seems
always to be a demand for them even in difficult times. When
interest rates are high private construction drops off. We don't
quit writing bonds when interest rates go up, the construction
industry just asks for less since less jobs are available. To
protect our investment we look primarily at the contractor and his
credit rating. The government seems always to be able to spend a
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good amount of money in construction even in economic slumps.
Therefore private construction is affected more by a rise in
interest rates than government construction. In the late 70's to
early 80's when interest rates went real high, as much 20%,
loosened their requirements and lowered their premiums to get more
money to invest. The entire insurance industry wanted to take
advantage of the high interest rates. A lot of construction
companies were able to get bonded for more jobs than they could
handle. They just didn't have the resources to keep all of their
jobs going and many defaulted. Also a lot of financially weak
construction companies were able to get bonds which increased
competition and reduced profit margins. Once the interest rates
dropped the insurance immediately increased their surety rates.
Question: Is death of a key person a concern?
3. Historically death is one of the biggest causes of failure.
The second generation management just can't run the business as
well as the original owner.
Question: Is the high rate of personnel turnover in the
construction a problem?
4. Personnel turnover is not a big problem or not a cause for
failure because if a company is doing well the employees will
generally stick around. It is when the company starts having
problems that people start looking for other jobs.
Question: Is technical complexity of today's construction a
possible reason for failures?
5. Yes, you must always look at a contractors expertise or
construction specialty or if he is using a new type of construction
specified by an A&E. Another type job that causes problems are high
profile jobs. These jobs get in the news and are delayed by special
interest groups. Contractors can have lots of money and equipment
tied up in these projects. The delays hurt him by disrupting his
schedul es
.
Question: Are their any types of contractors that fail more than
others .
6. Subcontractors are underwritten much closer than general
contractors since they are further away from the money. Most surety
companies try not to bond subs. Some specialty contractors are
getting involved with long term warranties such as for roofs and




Date: 5 September 1989
Interviewed: Mr. Gary Fowler
Associated General Contractors, Atlanta Chapter




This phone call was initiated by the author in attempt to get
the address of the National AGC as well as gain local sources of
information. I spoke with a Mr. Gary Fowler of the Atlanta AGC. He
was very receptive but unable to provide me with much information.
He did provide a few possible information sources (Means and Dodge)
and gave me the address to the National AGC. He also stated that
the national AGC got all of its information from Dun & Bradstreet
and probably would not have anything in addition to what I already
had.
He stated that in his chapter's history since 1929 only 2 of
their construction companies had been taken over by bonding
companies. One failure occurred when the firms owner received a
serious back injury and the individual running the firm in the
owner's absence ran the company into bankruptcy. He didn't remember
why the other failed. He felt their good record was due to their
good information exchange. When ask what he thought were the
biggest problems resulting in failure of firms today he said
underbidding and not keeping track of projects.
He suggested a book that may be a good reference called "A
Contractors Survival Guide" by Thomas C. Schleifer. Mr. Schleifer
was once a contractor who got into the business of providing
management assistance to save troubled construction firms from
failure. He did so well at it that the AGC hired him to go on tour
around the country giving speeches on how to save construction
firms from failure. Today Mr. Schleifer still does some work for
the AGC but is employed full time as a professor at East Carolina
University in Greenville NC . His address is;
2 Upton Court
Greenville, NC 27858-8530
His book is published by; Asian Press
6731 Curran St.
McClean Va. 22101
The Address of the National AGC is;





Date: 12 September 1989
Interviewed: Mr. Lloyd Provost
Surety Association of America
100 Wood Ave South
Iselin, NJ 08830
(202) 494-7600
This interview was conducted over the phone with a Mr. Provost
who is Vice President of the Surety Association of America (SAA).
The SAA is a trade association founded in 1908 that provides surety
rate statistics and other data to its members.
Mr. Provost called in response to the correspondence shown in
Appendix B asking for his assistance. He was very congenial and
seemed extremely knowledgeable of the surety industry and
construction. Before becoming vice president of the SAA he was a
surety underwriter for many years.
Mr. Provost expressed that to his knowledge their is no
published information on construction failures outside of the
statistics published by Dun & Bradstreet quarterly and annually.
He suggested the reason for this lack of information is that
sureties, banks, and any other institution involved in the
financing and surety process of a construction project invest their
time and resources on the front end to evaluate the stability and
financial condition of a contractor. The processes following a
contractors failure do not lend themselves to recording of
statistics. When a contractor fails there is no interest in
spending anymore time or money than is absolutely required to
complete the necessary proceedings. And no one is willing to spend
their resources to keep statistics beyond that which is deemed
necessary for their particular organization. The majority of US
construction contractors have less than 4 employees and not much
attention is paid to their failure. The contractors themselves are
more concerned with what is next than providing information as to
the reasons for their failure. Also if records were kept based
primarily on the failed contractors opinion of why he failed the
records would be of limited value because many contractors don't
know why they failed. And failures are usually a result of a
combination of events. It would be very difficult to pinpoint or
narrow down the reasons for most failures to one or two.
Discussion then ensued concerning his ideas on the reasons for
construction firm failures and is summarized below.
1. An uneven economic climate many times results in failures
since construction profit margins are typically slim. The public
has a misconception of the amount of profit contracting firms
receive for their efforts. Large firms generally have very small
profit margins of about 0.5 percent. Small firms generally have
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margins of between 3 and 5 percent. As interest rates go up profits
are eaten up. Companies have bid too low to many times and gone
bankrupt. A project can be running fine and the unexpected happens
costing the contractor a lot of money and he defaults. Material
prices should be watched by contractors. The price of copper is a
good example. Small increases in copper can increase the price of
a project significantly.
2. Regional economics are a problem. In the 70's we had relative
prosperity on both costs with several pockets in middle America
that were in trouble such as the corn belt and oil producing
regions. These regions were dependent upon their local economics
for survival
.
3. The increasing amount of litigation and the adversarial nature
or relationship between builders and contractors and contractors
and subcontractors tends to bring construction down. Even partners
generally blame each other when their firm fails. Even the high
and rising cost of litigation contributes to construction firm
f ai 1 ures
.
When asked what contractor specialties he felt had the greatest
rate of failure he responded as follows. Summarizing;
Roofing contractors get into trouble primarily because of long
term guarantees. When a roof leaks the owner knows about it right
away and wants it repaired immediately. Roof leaks are hard to miss
with buckets placed everywhere to catch the incoming rain. Many
roof manufactures guarantee there roofs to last 20 years and the
owners try to incorporate that into the construction contract.
Contracts must be read thoroughly to prevent such inclusions. If
an owner wants a 20 year warranty on his roof he should deal with
the manufacture and not try to hold the contractor responsible for
manufacture defects or misrepresentations. The one year
construction warranty for materials and workmanship should be all
that is included in the construction contract.
Electrical contractors tend to fail more often than most
others. Possibly because of their high labor costs and they tend
to have a great number of wide variety jobs all going at the same
time. Their management is possibly spread too thin.
Paving contractors seem to do alright possibly because of the
ability to quickly get in, complete their job and get their money.
Also their type of construction is not as complex as say the
electrical contractor.
Mr. Provost explained that surety companies deal with only a
very small percentage of the nations contractors. Many owners and
contractors never use surety bonds. Although almost all federal,
state, and local contracts require their contractor to purchase
performance bonds that only accounts for a small percent of the
construction in this country. There are about 800,000 contractors
in the US of which about 30,000 purchase construction bonds. Only
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about 15 percent of surety premiums are from private construction
firms. The private owner has much more flexibility in selecting a
contractor than government agencies. The private owner can go out
and pick his contractor based on what ever requirements he chooses.
He has no requirement to stipulate bonding as a prerequisite for
awarding projects. Private owners tend to work with contractors
they are familiar with and trust. The large firms that build all
over the country usually require bonding because they don't have
close relationships with contractors everywhere they build and feel




Date: 12 September 1989
Interviewed: Mr. Mark Huber





This interview was conducted over the phone with Mr. Huber of
the National Association of Surety Bond Producers. He called in
response to correspondence previously mailed to his organization
as provided in Appendix B. He was very nice but unable to provide
any information requested since his association does not keep nor
compile any such statistics. He stated he did not know of any
organization besides Dun & Bradstreet that collected the kind of
failure statistics requested. He recommended Dun & Bradstreet and
McGraw-Hill as sources of information and also the Fails Management
Institute in Atlanta. The Fails Management Institute is a firm that
provides consulting and management services to surety companies and
contractors as well as others dealing with default and bankruptcy.
CMA of New Jersey was another management consulting firm that was




Date: 15 September 1989
Interviewed: Ruth Bernstien
The American Surety Association
1029 Vermont Ave NW
Suite 800
Washington DC 20005
Ruth Berstien phoned as a representative of the American
Surety Association in response to the letter mailed to them on
September 5th 1989. She stated that they are a very small trade
organization and do not keep statistics on anything that could help






This appendix contains all of the written correspondence
generated by this research. Any written response as a consequence
of a particular letter is provided immediately following that
letter. Phone calls as a response to any of the following letters
are presented as interviews in Appendix A.
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2945 Bent Creek Lane
Kennesaw, GA . 30144
May 8, 1989
US Small Business Administration
Office Of Economic Research
1441 L Street
Premier Bldg. Rm 414
Washington DC 20416
To whom it may concern:
1 am a graduate student at Georgia Institute of Technology and am
presently starting work on my master's research paper. My principal
area of study at Georgia Tech is Construction Management and for
my paper I have chosen to research trends in the small construction
industry. My attempts at finding data on this topic so far have
uncovered very little. Through local SBA officials I was informed
of possible assistance through your office and am excited at the
prospect of your assistance. Thus I am writing this letter in
request of your assistance.
First of all let me say, I understand there will probably be at
least a $10.00 charge to fill my request. But that is the extent
of my knowledge concerning your fees. Please, in the processing of
my request keep in mind that I would like to be consulted if the
fee will be more than $50.00. If there is any action on my part
that could speed up the process such as mailing the fee now,
answering questions about my request, or if you have suggestions
that might aid my research please feel free to call me at (404)
426-1944 collect. Also, call if my request cannot be filled within
2 to 3 weeks.
What I am looking for is primarily any statistical or other
information involving start-ups, survivals and failures of small
construction contractors throughout the US. I would prefer the
information be in some sort of tabular format but will be happy to
accept it in any form available. The specific information I am
looking for is as listed below;
Construction firm starts/failures over the past 20 years by:
-type (ie. electrical, mechanical, & general contractors
others if possible, please indicate if the
contractors were assisted by SBA or not, or if your
information involves only those assisted by the
SBA)
-numbers (ie. totals of each of the above types and
geographical location)
-owner (age, sex and race, again related to each of the above
contractor types)




-financial (any financial information related to the above
contractor's financial stability and profitability
such as annual revenues, earnings, total assets
etc. )
-labor (any labor force statistics related strictly to small
construction firms such as wages, race, sex, age,
years working in construction etc.)
-reasons for failures (I realize you may not have much on this
but would truly appreciate your perseverance
when looking)
I am attempting to study trends in the success and failure of small
construction firms. As an additional issue I wish to discuss the
assistance offered by SBA and statistics concerning the SBA ' s
effectiveness. Please keep these goals in mind and include any
additional information that you feel might be helpful in my
research.
Again, I am very appreciative of your help and encourage you to






2945 Bent Creek Lane
Kennesaw, GA . 30144
June 20, 1989
US Small Business Administration
Office Of Economic Research
1441 L Street
Premier Bldg. Rm 414
Washington DC 20416
To whom it may concern:
In early May I sent the attached letter to your office requesting
information I need for a masters degree research paper I'm doing.
I know my letter was received because an employee phoned me with
some very promising information about my request on May 12th.
Yesterday I phoned your office to inquire about the status of my
request and found out my request was no where to be found. I then
gave Mr. Dickson my request over the phone to save time but I'm not
sure I was able to relay everything I needed properly. Please
review my attached letter again, which defines in detail what I
need when preparing my request. Also, please consider I had mailed
an earlier request that was apparently lost and place this request
ahead of others so that I might receive it as soon as possible. I
need the information quickly to meet school deadlines with my
paper
.
My address is at the top of both of these letters but I will repeat
it here for your convenience.
Thomas J Foust
2945 Bent Creek Lane
Kennesaw, GA . 30144
Phone (404) 426-1944
Thanks again for your assistance and please call me if preparation













U.S. Small Business Administration
,\'-:.^ Washington, D.C. 20416
FFICE OF CM'EF COUNSEL FOR ADVOCACY
June 20, 1989
Thomas Foust
2945 Bent Creek Lane
Kennesaw, Georgia 30144
Dear Mr. Foust:
Working with data base member Kim Beverly, I have tried to fulfill
your request. We were unable to retrieve dates for contractors
starts and failures. Some information, as you can see, has been
provided in hard copy fashion. At the suggestion of Ms. Beverly,
I have enclosed an order form for various publication and reports.
The Handbook of Small Business Data will be a very informative and
reliable source. If you have any further questions or requests,
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The State of Small Business: A Report of the President
Since its inida] publication in 1982, this annual repon has established itself as the auihontaove source of
information on small business It reports on the current economic climate for small businesses, including
job creation, business formanon, earnings, failure and bankmpicy rales, and the current outlook for new
and small businesses. Separate seaion.s of the volume report on financing trends for small businesses and
on federal procurement from small businesses during the preceding fiscal year. E)etailed supplementan
tables la each year's report provide both oirrent and historical data.
1 987 / M5 pp Sofurover / Slock no. 045-000-00:46-2 / S 10.00
1988 / 227 pp. Sofuovtr / Suxrk no. 045-000-00249-7 / J7.00
1989/ l96ppSofurovtr /Slock no 045-000-00255- 1 /J6 00
Small Business in the American Economy
This book is a compatuon volume to the 1988 edition of The Slate ofSmall Business It provides an in-
depth look at employee training in small firms, small businesses ui the manufacturing mdusines, the
growth and charaaenstics of women-owned businesses, the phenomenon of entreprer>eurshjp in minoniy
communities, and a look at what the state of small business will be in the year 2000. Numerous tables
and charts throughout the tent amplify the analysis.
1988/ 214 pp Softcovcr/ Stock no. 045-00(MX)25:-7 / J6 50
Hanidbook of Small Business Data
Drawing on the unique resources of the Small Business Data Base maintained by the SB A's Office of
Advocacy , this volume is a detailed sourcebook of current sianstics oo small busiriess In over 50 tables.
users will find .such mformaoon on small businesses as their number, their eeoeraphic location bv
region, state, and .Metropoliuin StatisQcal Area; their current number of employees and hisioncaJ data on
small-business emplovment from 1976. their industnal distnbuooa and a companson of the Small Busi-
ness Data Base with other statisucal compilaDons. such as those published by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and ihc Bureau of the Censos The text that accomparues these tables offers the reader clear
explanauons of the make-up of the small-business sector of the US economy, the various methods used
to measure it. and how and why those methods agree or differ in their results.
1988/ J44 pp Sofico.er /Slock no CM5-0OO-O025?-5/$ 10.00
The States and Small Business: A Directory of Programs and Activities
1989 Edition
With lis staie-by-state listing of offices, programs. arKi rrceni legislanon affectiDg small businesses, this
biannual publicanon is an indispensahle resource for small business owners, business coosuliants, and
anyone considering starting a business In it the user will find mformaoon on state loan programs,
procurement and repulaipn' assistance, special assistance programs (such as those targeted at high tech
irxiustnes. minonty-owned businesses, rural communjues. etc.), trade and ejipon assistance, and recent
stale Icgislaoon affecong small business A name, address, and telephone number is given for each
program or aaivity descnbed
1989 / 4 1 1 pp Sofeovcr / Slock no. CU5-OO0-OO257 8 / $ 1 100
Simplified Employee Pensions: What Small Businesses Need to Know
Simplified Employee Pensions—or SEPs—make ii vastly simpler for small businesses to offer retire-
ment savings plans to their employees In an easy-to-follow format, this booklet provides helpful infor-
mauon about SEPs: what thev are. how to establish one. and answers to commonly asked quesnons
about SEPs. It IS certain to he of use to every small business considering a SEP as a renrement savmgs
vehicle.
1988/ 12 pp, Solirovcr/SiOfk no 045-000-0025^-0/$! 00




All pnccs include regular domesuc postage and handbng. Foreign ordere should add an addiuona] 25't'c. Rerura this order form with
your payment to. Superintendent of Documents, U.S Government FYinang Office, Vi'ashington, DC 20402-9325 or call (202) 783-
3238 durmg daytime hours for orders charged to Visa, Mastercard, Choice, or a GPO Deposit Account.
SHIP TO:PLEASE SEND THE FOLLOWING PUBLICATIONS:
Qiy Slock Number Title Prke Tout
045-000-00^16-: 1 TheSuieofSm.llBusineu 1987 1000
ft45-00O-00i49.7 ! The Sue cfSmill Business 1988 7,00
CM5-OOCVOO:3S.| 1 TheSur ofSmillBusineu 1989 6 00
1
OlS-OOO-OOiS:-'; | Sm»JIBu»meMirn>ieAmcnc»n Economy 6_V)
, j
W?.OOO-O0i.Vl-5
1 H«n*oo4iof Sm»ll BuJine«D»u 1000
04?-000-00157.S The Sutcs and SmiJI Basineu t;.oo
1
045-0(10-0(11^6-0 Simplified Employee Pensions 1.00 j





(City, Suie. ZIP Code)
(Dayume pnonc number including area cooc)
METHOD OF PAYMENT:
I I Checic payable lo the Supennlendeni of DocumenU
D GPO Deposit Account a
I I







J.S SmaJI Business Adminisiration
Dffice of Advocacy
vlai]Code31IO
Wl L Street NW
A'ashingion, DC 20416
Official Use
'enaJty for Private Use, $300




Table 3a. Age and Marital Status of Owner by Industry Division: 1982
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CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS 11

Table 10a. Year and Method Business Was Acquired by Owner, by Industry Division: 1982
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iri TheDun&Bradstreet
lii Corporation ^ttV^ :X vi-?^:
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U.S. BUSINESS FAILURES SHOW NO GROWTH IN 19 87
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EIGHT YEARS
D&B Economist Joseph W. Duncan Says 1987 Failure Data
Reflect Fundamental Strength of U.S. Economy
NEW YORK, Feb. 5—After increasing for eight consecutive years,
the number of U.S. business failures leveled off at 61,236 in
1987, according to The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation.
"The current pattern of business failures underscores the
fundamental strength of the U.S. economy," said Joseph W.
Duncan, corporate economist and chief statistician for The Dun &
Bradstreet Corporation. "In 1987, failures were down or flat in
seven of the nation's nine census regions, and only two industry
sectors—agriculture and services—reported growth in business
failures.
"
According to Dun & Bradstreet data, failures in 1987 totaled
61,236, down 0.6 percent from 61,601 in 1986. In contrast,





Duncan noted that the gains in total U.S. failures in recent
years have been centered in Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana,
because of the severe stress in the oil sector and its ripple
effect on other industries in the region. Combined failures for
the three states rose 158 percent to 12,371 in 1986 from 4,791
in 1984. In 1987, failures in Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoina
totaled 12,319, essentially unchanged from the level in 1986.
While agriculture and services both reported gains in
failures in 1987, the factors behind the increases were
different. Agriculture failures rose 42.9 percent to 3,783 from
2,647 as a direct result of the introduction of Chapter 12 of
the bankruptcy code in November 1986. Chapter 12 provides
family farmers with an opportunity to reorganize their debt
while protected from creditors. Prior to the introduction of
Chapter 12, most farmers had no choice but to liquidate their
assets in order to meet the demands of creditors.
"The availability of Chapter 12 produced a spike in
agriculture failures in the first six months of 1987, as many
farmers took advantage of the new legislation," said IXincan.
"In the second half, however, agriculture failures were flat
compared with the same period in 1986."
Several factors contributed to the increase in services
failures, which rose 14.6 percent to 24,029 from 20,966.
"The current business expansion has been driven by a high
level of entrepreneurial activity in the services sector,
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services," said Duncan. "With the expansion now more than five
years old, we've seen evidence of increased competition in the
services sector, particularly as many large companies have
scaled back their spending in an effort to control costs and
maintain growth."
Regional Trends in 1987 Business Failures
The Pacific states reported the largest decrease in failures,
down 8.4 percent to 12,449 from 13,597. Substantial declines
occurred in Washington, Oregon and Hawaii. In New England,
which led the current economic recovery and has seen strong
growth in recent years, failures were down 6.3 percent, though
the decline in actual numbers was relatively small, to 1,03 9
from 1,109. Significant decreases were reported in
Massachusetts and Connecticut. Failures in New Hampshire,
however, rose from 56 to 135 largely because of the high levels
of entrepreneurial activity in the state in recent years.
The East North Central states of the industrial Midwest
showed a negligible decrease in failures, down 0.9 percent to
9,585 from 9,671. The pattern in the region was mixed, with
decreases in Ohio and Wisconsin and gains in Indiana and
Michigan. Failures in Illinois were unchanged from 1986. The
overall level of economic strength in the region, however, has
been building as manufacturers benefit from increased export
activity resulting from the decline in the dollar.
"The industrial Midwest will be one of the bright spots in




contributing to total U.S. economic growth," said Duncan.
Despite the surge in agriculture failures in the spring,
failures in the breadbasket states of the West North Central
region showed no growth by the end of the year. Substantial
farming-related gains in Nebraska, South Dakota and Iowa were
offset by a sharp decrease in failures in Kansas.
Growth in business failures in 1987 was flat in both the West
South Central and the Mountain states. Trends in failures in
both regions reflect the fact that the impact from the stress in
the energy sector has peaked. While failures in Texas were up
9.0 percent, Louisiana failures were unchanged and Oklahoma
posted a sharp drop of nearly 26 percent. Trends in failures in
the Mountain states are largely determined by patterns in
Colorado— by far the most populous state in the region—which
posted an 11.7 percent decline last year.
The Middle Atlantic states recorded a slight increase in
failures last year, up 1.8 percent. Along with the New England
states, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania have experienced
robust economic growth in recent years. Failures dropped 14.9
percent in New Jersey and were essentially unchanged in
Pennsylvania. New York recorded a 14.5 percent increase in
business bankruptcies, but the gain was primarily the result of
strong entrepreneurial activity in recent years rather than
economic weakness.
Failures in the South Atlantic states posted the largest




Failures in Florida—the largest state in the region—were down
3.4 percent, reflecting the fact that the increase in failures
in the region was almost entirely related to a dramatic gain of
100 percent in Georgia.
"The increase in failures in Georgia is essentially an echo
to the entrepreneurial boom that occurred in and around Atlanta
earlier in this economic expansion," said Duncan. "Though the
numbers are startling, it's important to recognize that they
reflect risk-taking rather than a collapse in the local economy,
which remains relatively strong."
Failures in the East South Central states rose 6.1 percent,
but the gain represented a relatively small numerical increase
to 3,199 from 3,016.
Industry Trends
While failures rose in the agriculture and services sectors,
significant decreases occurred in all other industries. The
largest decrease was reported in the mining sector, which
includes oil and gas extraction, down 32.6 percent. The decline
primarily reflects the fact that many of the weak or marginal
companies already have folded, rather than reduced stress in the
industry.
The decreases in failures in manufacturing, transportation,
wholesaling, retailing and finance, insurance and real estate
all ranged from about 10 percent to 13 percent, reflecting the
overall economic stability in most industries. Construction




Dun & Bradstreet's business failure statistics include
businesses that ceased operations following assignment or
bankruptcy; ceased operations with losses to creditors after
such actions as foreclosure or attachment; voluntarily withdrew
leaving unpaid obligations; were involved in court actions such
as receivership, reorganization or arrangement; or voluntarily
compromised with creditors.
The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation is the world's largest
marketer of business information and related services with
revenue of $3.4 billion in 1987.
(See attached tables.)

THE DUN & BRADSTREET CORPORATION - Economic Analysis Department
Business Failures By Industry Sector
December 1986 vs. December 1987 *
Industry 1986 1987 % Change
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 247 209 -15.4%
Mining 69 42 -39.1%
Construction 571 438 -23.3%
Manufacturing 385 278 -27.8%
Transportation & public utilities 190 169 -11. 1%
Wholesale trade 360 296 -17.8%
Retail trade 938 913 -2.7%
Finance, insurance & real estate 237 177 -25.3%
Services 1,857 1,875 1.0%
Unclassif iable establishments 61 44
Total 4,915 4,441 -9.6%
Business Failures by Industry Sector
Total twelve months 1986 vs. total twelve months 1987 *
Industry 1986 1987 % Change
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2,647 3,783 42.9%
Mining 923 622 -32.6%
Construction 7,110 6,724 -5.4%
Manufacturing 4,776 4,317 -9.6%
Transportation & public utilities 2,565 2,240 -12.7%
Wholesale trade 4,865 4,304 -11.5%
Retail trade 13,623 12,185 -10.6%
Finance, insurance & real estate 2,778 2,492 -10.3%
Services 20,966 24,029 14.6%
Unclassifiable establishments 1,348 540
Total 61,601 61,236 -0.6%
*Data for 1986 are final; 1987 figures are preliminary.
Source: The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
Economic Analysis Department

•O O fM •- O
K» •- rv rg •-" « m*
rg u^ K S rg ry •- I
fO ^ rv 00 rg <C ^ (
^ l/^ •- fv fw ^ <»
-^ O N. ^ •- <> tn
-# Kt •- (N( K. * ry
rg ^ ©. •-
r^ to > ~r '- N. k/^ u-t O rg >v in%»i»i«rK«5iNio
o o CM e
-o
•- »r> ^ s > tn K. h*PO F^ rg «- M
: 2
rg
*# K. *0 l/N
f>. O ^ Kl Os
fn p<n ^« h^
rgK>^*trg^^rs*
rg
rg •- rg •- K. s» fvi
gM M M M M M
^ o » ^ eo -o
l/v ^ o N.' o .- ».
«0 O rg fO »
. rg . .
C K. « e » e ^e ^ rg 5 Ki g »»> n ^
S 5"SS^ IP
8 I
Z — 3 U X < 3 3 < X 3 O U ^
4U U
' 'C f^ 9' -4 \r\ ^ •-
(^ CD n ^ •-
•- *•- O K-K-tr* in O'K^POCrg rg >oO>hn*-rg«> O ^ «rgkAfsjrgrNj
^ •- •- o ^^^^^ u^
gn. O><o>w^rg0 ip ^ rsj r^ •- rv*^90K- rg >rvtrg«-^e» e rg'Ob/^'neDrgNr^^•-




5 "D (^ O
§ ;
i>4 y^ isi ^ 'C -^ •^ O^o^ ^ rg^-oo^- oo r\j<^o^-rgOQ n. K.^rMOrsjK.^>
pg fcA
-oh "C o rg ^ ^ g^ -o^ rg
e •- -C '
u c
S :;:
OE ^ CO tl
CD « > >
Z V) V ^
hu VI y wX 3 £ O
*- CD O *-
8 s-i- ; -*^^ ^
I
5 - 2 S
-• « Jt » > Of (BC— gc — — ••« •- ^**<«i.
'— I.I.— 5 — c« B o t- o a -M < Ci-u; —
y uj o«i>kS C9e>C S >" 3 •<»> t a — c >
c c
«xSa(v _j >.->« EC -5 k o^^ae x — *»-- ^io>-
K«>zua( z zzo. u B — — K3 S x — zs</>xx ^ ZOO>3XV>U>^
t I

2945 Bent Creek Lane




Surety Bond Claims Office
4040 North Fairfax Dr.
Room 500
Arlington, VA . 22203
Dear Barbara Racine, Claims Manager:
I am a engineering graduate student at Georgia Institute of
Technology and am presently working on my master's research paper.
My principal area of study at Georgia Tech is Civil Engineering/
Construction Management. For my paper I have chosen to study
reasons for failures of small construction firms that are not
within the control of the firm's managers. My attempts at finding
data on this topic so far have uncovered very little. Through local
Small Business Administration officials I was informed of possible
assistance through your organization and am excited at the prospect
of your assistance. I have already requested and received
information from the SBA data bank of the Office of Economic
Research, but it was not very helpful. I have seen an SBA
instruction which lists codes for various types of failures.
Percentages of failure for each of your failure codes would be very
helpful especially if I could have it by year for the last 10 or
20 years. Thus, I am sending this letter in request for your
assistance
.
I general, I am looking for any information on start-ups, survival
rates, reasons for failures, etc of small construction contractors
throughout the US. Some specific information I am looking for is
as listed below;
Construction firm starts/failures over the past 20 years by:
-type (ie. electrical, mechanical, S. general contractors
others if possible)
-numbers (ie. totals of each of the above types and
geographical location)
-owner (age, sex and race, again related to each of the above
contractor types)
-dates (dates associated with the contractor starts and
failures above)
-financial (any financial information related to the above
contractor's financial stability and profitability
such as annual revenues, earnings, total assets
etc. )
-labor (any labor force statistics related strictly to small
112

construction firms such as wages, race, sex, age,
turn-over rates of construction workers, etc.)
****
-reasons for failures (This is the major concern of my
research. I need to know to what extent each reason
contributes to construction firm failures. I will




If there is any action on my part that could help you or speed up
things such as answering questions about my request, or if you have
suggestions that might aid my research please feel free to call me
at (404) 426-1944 collect. As with everything, I have deadlines to
meet and thus request any information you may be able to provide
as soon as possible.
Again, I am very appreciative of your help and encourage you to






There was no reply from the SBA Claims Office
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Surety Association of America
100 Wood Ave South
Iselin, N.J. 08830
Dear Mr. Provost:
I am a engineering graduate student at Georgia Institute of
Technology and am presently working on my master's research paper.
My principal area of study at Georgia Tech is Civil Engineering/
Construction Management. For my paper I have chosen to research
reasons for failures of small construction firms that are not
within the control of the firm's managers. My attempts at finding
data on this topic so far have uncovered very little. Through local
Small Business Administration officials and surety companies I was
informed of possible assistance through your organization and am
excited at the prospect of your assistance. Thus, I am writing this
letter to request your assistance.
I am looking for any statistical or other information involving
start-ups, survival rates and failures of small construction
contractors throughout the US. Some specific information I am
looking for is as listed below;
Construction firm starts/ fai lures over the past 20 years by:
-type (ie. electrical, mechanical, & general contractors
others if possible)
-numbers (ie. totals of each of the above types and
geographical location)
-owner (age, sex and race, again related to each of the above
contractor types)
-dates (dates associated with the contractor starts and
failures above)
-financial (any financial information related to the above
contractor's financial stability and profitability
such as annual revenues, earnings, total assets
etc . )
-labor (any labor force statistics related strictly to small
construction firms such as wages, race, sex, age,
turn-over rates of construction workers etc.)
****
-reasons for failures (This is the major concern of my
research. I am looking primarily for reasons not
within the control of the construction firm
such as sky rocketing interest rates or employee
embezzlement. In addition to the reasons I need to
know to what extent each reason contributes to
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construction firm failures. I will truly appreciate
your perseverance in providing this information.)
If there is any action on my part that could help you or speed up
things such as answering questions about my request, or if you have
suggestions that might aid my research please feel free to call me
at (404) 426-1944 collect. As with everything, I have deadlines to
meet and thus request any information you may be able to provide
as soon as possible.
Again, I am very appreciative of your help and encourage you to





The Surety Association of America sent several brochures on
bonding as well as a study on contractor failure as related to the
surety industry entitled "Losses In Private Sector Construction Due
To Contractor Failure". The study was sponsored by The Surety
Association of America and The National Association of Surety Bond
Producers. It was conducted by Ardrey Inc. and completed in March
1988. Also sent was an excerpt from a publication called The
Contractor which follows. The study and brochures were too thick
to include in this study and were given to the Georgia Tech Price
Gilbert Memorial Library for future reference. No letter
accompanied the information but a lengthy phone interview is




, £.. wo.oiio ui J icncs 01 insur-
ance policii;s that uojld spread the nsk of
construction and reduce liabilit) 1 .lion
among construction participants. These
policies would address three areas of
concern:
(1) the exposure of the construction
leant to claims of bodily injury or proper-
ty damage to non-tcani nicnibcrs,
(2) claims of physical damage and
financial loss of the conitruciion par-
ticipants, and
(3) claims tor damage after com.p!etion
of the project
V—^M jiLj Ki.c, acsign,
construction, products) to the overall
project.
Under the policy concept, the deducti-
bles would apply to each party, individ-
ually, who \\ould be involved in effecting
repairs. In other words, in the case of any
property loss where repairs to the project
were required to be made by a subcontrac-
tor, that subcontractor would be responsi-
ble for the costs up to the applicable deduc-
tible. That deductible would be t«o per-
cent of the total value of the construction
Thus, explained Kinser. "Onh' if the
cost of repairs by any particular subcon-
tractor exceeded two percent of the total
Small firms have most profit
Smaller construction I'lriiis are ou: per-
forming larger construction firms, accord-
ing to the Contractor Profit News iCP.N")
financial statistics survey.
"While snull firms reported a median
operating profit of 5 o percent. tJiis s'.e^dil)
declined to where firms over S50 million
111 revenue reported a median ope.'atmg
profit of onl\ .5 percent." sa>s CPN
Publisher Frank A Susiowskf^This result
confirms the current viewpoint that there
arc too many large firms chasing too few
large project^ Th:s icads tu llrms ijkmg
projects at littic or no profit. acLori:;rig to
Siasiowski
.This independent survey of construction
firms found that general contractors col-
lect ilicir pav ments ID da\ s faster Lhan sub-
contractor firms.
The profit results are bciicr for l"irn;s in
the .Nonlicast region, in merit lopen s.iop)
firms, and firms doing primarily govern-
ment work. The tlndmgs on government
versus private sector ilrms results is a sur-
prise, says CPN Director of Research
William Fanning.
In other findings, government sector
firms spend more on direct project laDor—
a portion of pr-ojec: costs— than do r.'ivaie
sector ilrms. This sarr.e higher direct iat^or
cost also was present in the comparison of
union and open sliop firms, with union
firms having a much greater level of ex-
pense for direct project labor.
"This higher labor cost was certainlv not
unexpected, however, the analv sis did pro-
duce one surprise in that it failed to sup-
port union claims that higher wages are
justified b> iiigher produciiviiy.
The survcv measured producliviiv on the
basis of revenues per employee, which can
be a productivity measure, as it measures
the average value of work produced by
each worker. This showed oniv a stati>t-
icallv insignificant three percent difference
in favor of union firms, with the respec-
tive median revenues per emplovcc being
562.000 (union) and S6U.000 (open '.licpi.
The complete survey, containing data on
1S3 firms, is available from Contractor
Profit Ncw's. Ten Midland Ave
.
Newton.
MA 0215S, The cost of the lull survc>
report is S95 prepaid
Arizona subs want co
The American Subcontractors Associa-
tion of Arizona has formed a coalition
along with 17 other state construction
organizations to introduce parallel legisla-
tion into both the Arizona House and the
Senate on licensing of commercial work
This action is in response to unfair com-
petition imposed b^ companies w ho are not
properly licensed by the state of .Arizona
These employers do not provide vvorkers
compensation, unemployment insurance,
or any other employee benefits \i.hich
usually run 25 to 35 percent of all labor
year 01 IV /J. 1 lie current Oolliii ••.:/....
new construction was about S340 biliicn;
"The value of residential conitruction
was about the same as in 1984. a'tiiough
the pace of homebuilding accclcr.itcd dur-
ing 1985," according to the dcpartnient".
bimonthly Construction Review "Private
nonresidential construction extcciicd the
record level set in 1984 by 10 [:rcei)i.
largely on the strength of the cuir.nercKil
building boom. Public works con;;ri;ction
increased by about nine percent, w;;.'i c.tuis
in most ivpes of public works
The Commerce Department fc^ui.J that
the value of new construction pu' .r. place
last vear was equal to about 8 9 p:'..-n; of
G.NP Construction costs incrc3-:J Ic-s
than three percent between the su' :iicr ni
1984 and the summer of i''-5. as
. measured by ihc Census Uurca. ; loiii-
posiie construction cost indc. "Tins
represents ihc fcurlh cnnsccuin,- j.ir nf
moder.nc coiisiruLlion cosi iiiLfcj .- .i;-
cording to Ihc ConsiructiiKi Rc^ ,..
Average luiuil'. c.irnings ot ci'ii :-.,tiiMi
wnrkci s iiiLtciscd b_v annul 1 ,5 p.-'.jn; in
1985, while the producer pin.e ir.j.-\ \"i
construction m.ucri.ils increased :. iw.i
percent. Coiisiru^liuii indiisirv cr'i'Mv-
mcnl rose ci:;ht percent in 19H5 ^c. .in
all-lmic record iifd 7 iiiiIIhmi en r '•,-.';
In addiliuii. mure llian one millir- : . 'pIc
were scll-cmpl'ivcd as pn'pnc' > .md
woi king p.irtncrs
"Dcsi)itc the recent niodcMiiu:! n imi-
stru^tioM wage increases. consirij,!"'n re-
mained one 111 the highest p.iv iiig n; .jsincs
as measured bv avcr.ige liourK ...:"ii:.js
ntractor licensing hn\
costs .-Xs a result, com factors wii'' r'l-v iJe
benefits to their empiovees arc fv.cJ to
pay more of their profits for lar.T ex-
penses, and are clearly at a disaj.::ii,"'.ge
when pricing jobs
if the bill requiring the licensing ^ ''v,';!!-
mcrcial work passes, it will re,:.;-: all
emplovers to applv for the prc^rc ..ens-
ing within ihc appropriate state a::";:es
This will guarantee th:t all ccn:rj.tors
appiv for the nccess.Trv hcenvcs. .''.s wc'l

















2945 Bent Creek Lane
Kennesaw, GA . 30144
(404) 426-1944
September 5, 1989
The American Surety Association
1029 Vermont Ave NW
Suite 800
Washington DC 20005
To whom it may concern:
I am a engineering graduate student at Georgia Institute of
Technology and am presently working on my master's research paper.
My principal area of study at Georgia Tech is Civil Engineering/
Construction Management. For my paper I have chosen to research
reasons for failures of small construction firms that are not
within the control of the firm's managers. My attempts at finding
data on this topic so far have uncovered very little. Through local
Small Business Administration officials and surety companies I was
informed of possible assistance through your organization and am
excited at the prospect of your assistance. Thus, I am writing this
letter to request your assistance.
I am looking for any statistical or other information involving
start-ups, survival rates and failures of small construction
contractors throughout the US. Some specific information I am
looking for is as listed below;
Construction firm starts/failures over the past 20 years by:
-type (ie. electrical, mechanical, & general contractors
others if possible)
-numbers (ie. totals of each of the above types and
geographical location)
-owner (age, sex and race, again related to each of the above
contractor types)
-dates (dates associated with the contractor starts and
failures above)
-financial (any financial information related to the above
contractor's financial stability and profitability
such as annual revenues, earnings, total assets
etc. )
-labor (any labor force statistics related strictly to small
construction firms such as wages, race, sex, age,
turn-over rates of construction workers etc.)
****
-reasons for failures (This is the major concern of my
research. I am looking primarily for reasons not
within the control of the construction firm
such as sky rocketing interest rates or employee
embezzlement. In addition to the reasons I need to
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know to what extent each reason contributes to
construction firm failures over a period of time.
I will truly appreciate your perseverance in
providing this information.)
If there is any action on my part that could help you or speed up
things such as answering questions about my request, or if you have
suggestions that might aid my research please feel free to call me
at (404) 426-1944 collect. As with everything, I have deadlines to
meet and thus request any information you may be able to provide
as soon as possible.
Again, I am very appreciative of your help and encourage you to






The American Surety Association reply wa:




2945 Bent Creek Lane
Kennesaw, GA . 30144
(404) 426-1944
September 5, 1989
National Association of Surety Bond Producers
6931 Arlington Road
Suite 308
Bethesda, Maryland 20814 .'
To whom it may concern:
I am a engineering graduate student at Georgia Institute of
Technology and am presently working on my master's research paper.
My principal area of study at Georgia Tech is Civil Engineering/
Construction Management. For my paper I have chosen to study
reasons for failures of small construction firms that are not
within the control of the firm's managers. My attempts at finding
data on this topic so far have uncovered very little. Through local
Small Business Administration officials and surety companies I was
informed of possible assistance through your organization and am
excited at the prospect of your assistance. Thus I am writing this
letter in request for your assistance.
I am looking for any information on start-ups, survival rates,
reasons for failures, etc of small construction contractors
throughout the US. Some specific information I am looking for is
as listed below;
Construction firm starts/ fai 1 ures over the past 20 years by:
-type (ie. electrical, mechanical, & general contractors
others if possible)
-numbers (ie. totals of each of the above types and
geographical location)
-owner (age, sex and race, again related to each of the above
contractor types)
-dates (dates associated with the contractor starts and
failures above)
-financial (any financial information related to the above
contractor's financial stability and profitability
such as annual revenues, earnings, total assets
etc. )
-labor (any labor force statistics related strictly to small
construction firms such as wages, race, sex, age,
turn-over rates of construction workers, etc.)
****
-reasons for failures (This is the major concern of my
research. I am looking primarily for reasons not
within the control of the construction firm
such as sky rocketing interest rates or employee
embezzlement. In addition to the reasons I need to
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know to what extent each reason contributes to
construction firm failures, I will truly appreciate
your perseverance in providing this information.)
If there is any action on my part that could help you or speed up
things such as answering questions about my request, or if you have
suggestions that might aid my research please feel free to call me
at (404) 426-1944 collect. As with everything, I have deadlines to
meet and thus request any information you may be able to provide
as soon as possible.
Again, I am very appreciative of your help and encourage you to






Response from National Association of Surety Bond Producers











To whom it may concern:
I am a engineering graduate student at Georgia Institute of
Technology and am presently working on my master's research paper.
My principal area of study at Georgia Tech is Civil Engineering/
Construction Management. For my paper I have chosen to research
reasons for failures of small construction firms that are not
within the control of the firm's managers. My attempts at finding
data on this topic so far have uncovered very little. Through local
Small Business Administration officials and surety companies I was
informed of possible assistance through your organization and am
excited at the prospect of your assistance. Thus, I am writing this
letter to request your assistance.
I am looking for any statistical or other information involving
start-ups, survival rates and failures of small construction
contractors throughout the US. Some specific information I am
looking for is as listed below;
Construction firm starts/failures over the past 2 yea rs by:
-type (ie, electrical, mechanical, & general contractors
others if possible)
-numbers (ie. totals of each of the above types and
geographical location)
-owner (age, sex and race, again related to each of the above
contractor types)
-dates (dates associated with the contractor starts and
failures above)
-financial (any financial information related to the above
contractor's financial stability and profitability
such as annual revenues, earnings, total assets
etc. )
-labor (any labor force statistics related strictly to small
construction firms such as wages, race, sex, age,
turn-over rates of construction workers etc.)
****
-reasons for failures (This is the major concern of my
research. I am looking primarily for reasons not
within the control of the construction firm
such as sky rocketing interest rates or employee
embezzlement. In addition to the reasons I need to
know to what extent each reason contributes to
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construction firm failures. I wi 1 ] truly appreciate
your perseverance in providing this information.
If there is any action on my part that could help you or speed up
things such as answering questions about my request, or if you have
suggestions that might aid my research please feel free to call me
at (404) 426-1944 collect. As with everything, I have deadlines to
meet and thus request any information you may be able to provide
as soon as possible.
Again, I am very appreciative of your help and encourage you to











This appendix contains data compiled during this study for
development of graphs and evaluating construction industry trends.
The data is presented here in tabulated form to provide a more
detailed look at values plotted on the graphs, aid in the





CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PERCENTAGE OF GNP
TOTAL CONST. PERCENT GNP
YEAR GNP GNP CONST.
1948 261.60 11.50 4.40
1949 260.40 11.50 4.42
1950 288.30 13.20 4.58
1951 333.40 15.60 4.68
1952 351.60 16.90 4.81
1953 371.60 17.50 4.71
1954 372.50 17.70 4.75
1955 405.90 19.10 4.71
1956 428.20 21.30 4.97
1957 451.00 22.20 4.92
1958 456.80 21.80 4.77
1959 495.80 23.70 4.78
1960 515.30 24.30 4.72
1961 533.80 25.30 4.74
1962 574.60 27.10 4.72
1963 606.90 28.90 4.76
1964 649.80 31.60 4.86
1965 705.10 34.70 4.92
1966 772.00 37.90 4.91
1967 816.40 39.70 4.86
1968 892.70 43.50 4.87
1969 963.90 48.70 5.05
1970 1015.50 51.40 5.06
1971 1102.70 56.50 5.12
1972 1212.80 63.00 5.19
1973 1359.30 70.40 5.18
1974 1472.80 74.50 5.06
1975 1598.40 76.50 4.79
1976 1782.80 86.20 4.84
1977 1990.50 97.90 4.92
1978 2249.70 115.60 5.14
1979 2508.20 131.40 5.24
1980 2732.00 137.70 5.04
1981 3052.60 138.40 4.53
1982 3166.00 140.90 4.45
1983 3405.70 149.60 4.39
1984 3772.20 171.50 4.55
1985 4014.90 186.60 4.65







ource: All data for Table C-1 is from the National Income and Product




























































YEAR CAUSES NEGLECT FRAUD DISASTER UNKNOWN TOTAL
1960 90.5 3.2 1.2 0.4 4.7 100.0




1965 91.9 3.8 1.7 0.5 2.1 100.0
1966 94.2 3.0 1.3 0.4 1.1 100 .0
1967
1968 90.8 2.9 0.7 0.7 4.9 100.0
1969 88.7 3.2 0.9 0.3 6.9 100 .0
1970
1971
1972 94.2 2.5 1.1 0.0 2.2 100.0
1973
1974 92.6 2.4 0.7 0.5 3.8 100.0
1975 91.9 1.0 0.3 1.1 5.7 100.0
1976 92.1 1.0 0.3 0.9 5.7 100.0
1977
1978 92.1 0.9 0.3 0.4 6.3 100.0
1979 93.6 0.9 0.4 0.1 5.0 100.0
AVERAGE 91.9 2.3 0.8 0.5 4.5





1984 74.2 4.0 0.5 0.7 20.6 100.0
1985 79.6 2.7 0.5 0.6 16.6 100.0
1986 81.7 1.8 0.4 0.5 15.6 100.0
1987 80.6 1.9 0.2 0.4 16.9 100.0
AVERAGE 79.0 2.6 0.5 0.4 17.5
SOURCE: The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., Business Failure Record,




CONTRACTOR TYPES BY PERCENTAGE
1967 1972 1977 1982 AVERAGE
SMALL GENERAL CONTRACTORS 34.55 36.17 38.12 32.52 35.34
SMALL SPECIALTY CONTRACTORS 58.96 60.90 59.49 64.19 60.89















100 100 100 99
From U.S. Census data using size standards as $25 and
$9.5 million which roughly corresponds to SIC standards





GENEF.AL CONTR. SUB--CONTR. OTHER CONTR. TOTAL CONTR.
SARS NUMBER LIABILITY NUMBER LIABILITY NUMBER LIABILITY NUMBER LIABILITY
L954 456 29757 793 23707 56 3365 1305 56829
L955 443 39872 880 34485 81 8867 1404 83179
L956 708 54115 1030 41400 96 5288 1834 100803
L957 805 64425 1175 36466 125 9421 2105 110312
L958 872 62758 1169 41006 121 11351 2162 115115
95 9 749 66075 1159 42492 156 13316 2064 121883
L960 1020 110656 1419 74177 168 16536 2607 201369
L961 1068 94042 1520 76685 164 22278 2752 193005
L962 1003 133901 1498 81370 202 28264 2703 243535
9fi^ 888 140630 1357 66680 156 24044 2401 231354
L964 970 171645 1275 74762 143 15985 2388 262392
L965 1030 196633 1329 78049 154 16298 2513 290980
L966 1049 229737 1326 80351 135 16288 2510 326376
L967 867 238854 1243 71380 151 13446 2261 323680
L968 656 135341 903 58207 111 18911 1670 212459
.969 626 95125 860 58910 104 17682 1590 171717
.970 659 122713 905 82818 123 26002 1687 231533
.971 533 123079 897 81441 115 17837 1545 222357
.972 513 91914 777 85900 85 15716 1375 193530
.973 534 182627 805 106494 80 19954 1419 309075
.974 714 367643 1023 126126 103 32829 1840 526598
.975 942 461987 1202 142039 118 36819 2262 640845
.976 716 261613 940 137049 114 30075 1770 428787
.977 608 168927 764 209126 91 42168 1463 420220
978 508 145643 631 140359 65 42376 1204 328378
979 631 147287 687 102511 60 41525 1378 291323
980 1071 334908 1164 333333 120 83868 2355 752109
981 1472 450968 1931 333315 211 67497 3614 851780
982 1877 616286 2642 599700 353 158333 4872 1374319
983 1830 588773 3004 716532 413 243249 5247 1548554
984 2474 771337 483 255228 3979 624901 6935 1651465
985 2759 1255490 419 113500 3827 634133 7005 2003123
986 2634 949259 449 134865 4026 698501 7109 1782625
987 2505 1459305 398 142998 3832 785581 6735 2387884
'988 2548 789358 350 154483 3893 899188 6791 1843029
1988 data is preliminary.






CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS AS A PERCENT
YEARS FAILURES FAILURES OF TOTAL
1954 1305 11086 11.77
1955 1404 10969 12.80
1956 1834 12686 14.46
1957 2105 13739 15.32
1958 2162 14964 14.45
1959 2064 14053 14.69
1960 2607 15445 16.88
1961 2752 17075 16.12
1962 2703 15782 17.13
1963 2401 14374 16.70
1964 2388 13501 17.69
1965 2513 13514 18.60
1966 2510 13061 19.22
1967 2261 12364 18.29
1968 1670 9636 17.33
1969 1590 9154 17.37
1970 1687 10748 15.70
1971 1545 10326 14.96
1972 1375 9566 14.37
1973 1419 9345 15.18
1974 1840 9915 18.56
1975 2262 11432 19.79
1976 1770 9628 18.38
1977 1463 7919 18.47
1978 1204 6619 18.19
1979 1378 7564 18.22
1980 2355 11742 20.06
1981 3614 16794 21.52
1982 4872 24908 19.56
1983 5247 31334 16.75
1984 6935 52078 13.32
1985 7005 57253 12.24
1986 7109 61616 11.54
1987 6735 61111 11.02
*1988 67 91 57098 11.89
** 1988 data is preliminary.







NEW HOME NEW HOME
30 YEAR ALL TYPE
PRIME CONSUMER CONVENTIONAL CONVENTIONAL
INTEREST PRICE MORTGAGE MORTGAGE






1959 4. 48 35.60
1960 4.82 36.20 6.21
1961 4.50 36.40 5.99
1962 4.50 36.90 5.93
1963 4.50 37.40 5.82 5.80
1964 4.50 37 .90 5.80 5.75
1965 4.54 38.50 5.81 5.74
1966 5.63 39.60 6.35 6.14
1967 5.63 41.00 6.53 6.33
1968 6.31 43.00 7.06 6.83
1969 7.95 45.50 7.91 7.65
1970 7.91 48.10 8.52 8.27
1971 5.72 49.70 7.80 7.59
1972 5.25 51.40 7.64 7.45
1973 8.02 55.80 8.22 8.78
1974 10.80 62.50 9.16 8.71
1975 7.86 67.10 9.12 8.75
1976 6.84 70.40 9.01 8.76
1977 6.82 75.10 8.94 8.80
1978 9.06 80.20 9.58 9.30
1979 12.67 92.20 10.97 10.48
1980 15.27 103.80 13.73 12.25
1981 18.87 113.70 16.36 14.17
1982 14.86 118.90 16.23 14.47
1983 10.79 122.80 13.44 12.20
1984 12.04 127 .80 13.88 11.87
1985 9.93 132.30 12.42 11.12
1986 8.33 134.00 10.18 9.82
1987 8.20 140.00 8.97
1988 9.32
SOURCE: Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates Group,
Tables from 3rd floor Georgia Tech Price Gilbert Library
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1954 19B0 1955 1972 1978 1984
1957 1963 1959 1975 1981 1987
YEAR
Figure C-6.1
Source: See Table C-6.
136






























1954 1960 1956 1972 1978 1984
1957 1963 1969 1975 1981
YEAR
Figure C-6.2
Source: See Table C-6.
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**CORPORATE *CORPORATE * INDUSTRY PROPRIETORS
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS INCOME INCOME
YEAR PROFITS (BILL) (MILLIONS) (BILLIONS) (MILLIONS)
1954 0.26 327 16.50 3385
1955 0.21 283 17.60 3681
1956 0.39 464 19.70 3895
1957 0.42 505 20.60 4188
1958 0.40 465 20.10 4016
1959 0.34 438 21.90 4416
1960 0.16 269 22.50 4426
1961 0.22 345 23.40 4827
1962 0.42 535 25.10 5058
1963 0.46 588 26.80 5368
1964 0.66 835 29.40 5835
1965 0.86 1073 32.30 6329
1966 1.02 1173 35.30 6669
1967 1.10 1334 36.90 6833
1968 1.20 1413 40.40 7249
1969 1.07 1345 45.10 7739
1970 1.03 1268 47.40 7755
1971 1.27 1518 52.10 9008
1972 1.19 1422 57.90 10953
1973 1.16 1428 64.70 11871
1974 1.24 1610 68.40 12816
1975 1.67 2049 69.90 13332
1976 2.01 2390 79.30 17724
1977 3.09 3514 90.40 20677
1978 3.91 4394 106.70 24819
1979 3.68 4122 121.40 26673
1980 3.75 4394 126.60 26300
1981 1.84 2509 126.50 23053
1982 1.20 1798 127.90 25014
1983 1.15 2079 135.50 30057
1984 2.58 2951 155.50 35021
1985 2.46 3875 169.10 36023
1986 2.76 4817 185.10 41133
1987 4894 196.70 44413
SOURCE: * National Income & Product Accounts Tables, Section 6,
Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office
Washington DC, 1988.
** Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates Group,





*FULL & AVG WKLY HRS
*WAGES & PART-TIME PRODUCTION PER
EMPLOYEE SALARY EMPLOYEES CONSTRUCTION









































































































































































































SOURCE: * National Income 6. Product Accounts Tables, Section 6,
Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office,
Washington DC, 1988.
** Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates Group,




VALUE OF NEW CONSTRUCTION TOTAL
PUT IN PLACE CONSTRUCTION
RESIDENTIAL NONRESIDENTIAL IN PLACE


























































Source: Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates Group,
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CONSTRUCTION FIRM FAILURES BY AGE OF FIRM
YEAR
YEARS AFTER COMPANY BEGINNING
3 4 5 6 7 8 10 > 10
1951 1.5 14,.4 16,.8 13.0 12.7 14.1 8.9 3.5 2,,1 1.,5 11,,5
1960 2.3 13,,3 15,,4 10.8 9.6 8.7 7.0 4.9 4.,0 3.,2 20.,8
1961 1.6 10,.9 15,.8 12.1 9.0 7.8 6.6 5.1 4,.8 3.,7 22,,6
1965 1.2 10,.3 15,.8 12.3 10.6 7.8 6.9 4.7 3.,5 3.,5 23..4
1966 1.4 9,.0 15,.4 12.8 10.3 8.4 6.4 5.0 4,.9 4.,1 22,,3
1968 1.0 7,.6 11,.8 12.6 10.4 8.6 6.9 4.9 5.,4 3.,7 27.,1
1969 1.4 8,.6 11,.8 11.0 10.1 8.4 8.1 6.0 5,,2 4.,3 25,,1
1972 1.3 10,,3 14,,8 12.4 8.8 7.7 6.2 5.1 5.,2 3.,5 24.,7
1974 0.9 10,.6 17,.5 15.2 10.8 8.0 6.3 4.3 2,.8 2.,7 20.,9
1975 0.4 7.,5 14..9 15.8 11.6 9.3 6.7 5.9 3..6 2.,5 21.,8
1976 0.8 5,,2 10,,6 14.6 15.1 9.7 8.0 5.5 4,.8 2,,9 22,,8
1978 0.5 6.,4 13..6 14.0 11.2 10.0 9.3 5.8 4,.9 3.,4 20.,9
1979 0.6 6,,0 13,,4 13.8 13.6 9.0 7.9 6.9 4 .6 3,,6 20,.6
1984 9.2 9.,2 9.,0 9.1 8.0 8.5 7.0 6.1 4,.5 3..9 25.,5
1985 8.6 11,,3 9..0 7.3 7.9 7.1 6.4 6.4 5 .8 4,.6 25 .6
1986 8.1 10.,8 10.,7 7.5 6.8 7.0 6.1 6.0 5,.3 5.,4 26,.3
1987 5.9 8.,3 9.,0 9.6 7 .8 6.5 6.3 4.9 5 .9 5,.3 30,.5
1988 5.1 8.,1 9.,5 9.8 8.7 6.8 5.4 5.1 4,.5 4.,6 32,.4
rOTAL 51.8 167.8 234.8 213.7 183 153.4 126.4 96.1 81.8 66.4 424.8
Note: Not all years are represented in this table due to lack of
available data.








Construction Firm Failure Rates
Year
GC & Operative Builder
Contr other than Bldgs
Specialty Contractors
Overall Rate
Number Fai lures per 10,000 Firms
1970 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
106 115 108 93 97
136 115 114 97 93
113 104 107 90 92
116 112 109 108 92 94
Source Years 1950,60 and




70 are actually 10 year averages from [Platt85]




Dun & Bradstreet Causes For Failure
This appendix contains excerpts from the Dun & Bradstreet
Business Failure Records of 1987 and 1966. The pages concerning
causes for business failures from each are reproduced and provided
here to afford the reader a better understanding of the discussion












(loreslrv & & public Wholesale Reieil iuuraoce &
fishing Mining Construction Mainulacturing ulililiei trede trade reel cstile Senrices Total
Neglect Causes 2.2% 0.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.6% 2.0% 2.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.6%
Bad habits 19.0% 20.0% 27.4% 33.0% 29.8% 33.6% 19.8% 21.4% 25.9% 25.4%
Business conflicts 3.6% 60.0% 10.7% 18.3% 21.6% 25.6% 15.0.% 28.7% 13.6% 15.1%
Fatnily problems 7. 1 % 0.0% 9.2% 7.3% 10.8% 4.7% 8.5% 10."% io.9';c, 8.8So
Lack of interest 52.4% 0.0% 19.8% 24.4%, 16.2% n.6% 22.3% 14.3% 14.3% 21,0%
Marital problems 4.8% 0.0% 11.5% 6.1% 8.1% 10.5% 10.9% 7.1% 9.7% 9.4%
Occupational conflicts 3.6% 0.0% 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 3.5% 8.5% 7.1% 8.5% 5.9%,
Poor health 9.5% 20.0% 19.1% 8.5% 10.8% 10.5% 15.0% 10.7% 17.1% 14 4%
Disaster Causes 0.2% 0.2% o.«% 0.6% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.2% 0,4%
Act of God 50.0% 0.0% 11.5% 14.3% 42.8% 4.2% 8.2% 0.0% 20.9% 13.9%
Burglary 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 5.5% 0.0% 2.3% 2.8%
Employee fraud 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 3.6% 14.3% 0.0% 4.1% 0.0% 2.3% 3.7%
Fire 25.0% 0.0% 11.5% 28.6% 14.3% 29.2% 50.7% 16.7% 42.0% 35.6%
Death of owner 25.0% 100.0% 69.3% 53.5% 28.6% 58.2% 31.5% 83.3% 30.2% 43.1%
Strike 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.9%
FrauiJ Causes 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 1.0% 0.1% 0.3%
Embezzlement 0.0% 33.4% 27.4% 15.4% 30.0% 22.7% 13.5% 28.0% 21.4%. 20.0%
False agreement 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 19.2% 10.0% 4.5% 11.5% 8.0% 10.7% 10.6%
False statement 0.0% 33.3% 9.1% 11.5% 10.0% 0.0% 5.8% 4.0% 10.-% 7.2°o
Irregular disposal of assets 100.0% 0.0% 2-.3% 30,9% 40.0% 31.9% 30.8% 44.0''-o 35.8% 33.9%
Misleading name 0.0% 0.0% 27.3% 11.5% 10.0% 13.6% 5.8% 8.0% 10.''% 10.0%
Premeditated overbu\ 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 11.5% 0,0% 2-.3% 32.6% 8.0% 10."% 18.3%
Economic Factors Causes 83.3% 85.0% 72.8% 67.7% 70.2% 70.7% 71.2% 68.1% 71.4% 71.7%
Insufficient prohts 71.1% 76.2% 73.5% 74.2% 71.7% 72.1% 71.1% 73.1% 79.9% "5.2%
High interest rates 4.7% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 1.3%- 1.0%
Loss of market 2.8% 11.9% 7.4% 7.8% s.r.o 7.8% 5.9% 9.1% 4.0% 5.5%
No consumer spending n . r/o 4.3% 9.7% 5.2% 12.0% 6.0% 13.3% 9.7% 7.6% 9.3%
No future 10.3% ".4% 9.0% 12.6% 10.0% 13.9% 9.6% 7.4% 7 "*% 9.0%
Experience Causes 12.6% 10.5% 19.4% 18.4% 19.8% 17.1% 20.1% 14.6% 23.0% 20.3%
Incompeience 63.0% 32.3% 47.1% 46.1% 50.6% 41.8% 44.6°o 41.5% 33.1% 39.-%
Lack of line experience 3.0% 12.3% 6.7% 11.2% 10.1% 12.0% 14.2% 14.2-.0 13.3% 11.8%
Lack of managerial experience 14.8% 33.9% 18.8% 12.3% 17.1% 12.3% 16.6% P..9% 9.3% 12.6%
Unbalanced experience 19.2%, 21.5% 2^.4% 30.4% 22.2% 33.9% 24.6% 31.4% 44.3% 35.9%
Sales Causes 5.5% 6.6% 11.9% 10.4% 12.1% 10.2% 13.0% 8.3% 11.6% 11.1%
CompetitivcK weak 8.6^0 2.4% 20.4 >„ 15.8% 26.1% 17.8% 24.5% 17.5% 12.4% 17.3%
Economic decline 49.8% 73.2% 33.3% 21.8% 29.8% 26.2% 23.6% 30.3% 28.2% 28.2%
Inadequate sales 41.6% 24.4% 46.0% 60.0% 42.2% 53.2% 47.8% 52.2% 58.8% 52.9%
Inxeniori, difficulties 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 1.5% 2.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.2% 0.8%
Poor location 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 2.5% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8%
Expenses Causes 5.3% 3.5% 6.0% 6,4% 6.3% 5.6% 5.8% 5.5% 10.6% 8.1%
Burdensome institutional debt 78.0% 31.8% 34.4% 53.3% 35.5% 46.9% 47.5% 46.8"o 41.8% 464%
Heavv opetating e.xpenses 22.0% 68.2% 65.6°o 46.-% 64.5% 53.1% 52.5%
,
53.2% 50.2% 53.6°o
Customer Causes 0.1% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 4%
Receivables difficulties 25.0% 0.0% 80.8% 66."% 53.3% 89.7% 28.2% 75.0% 28.2% 52.-%
Too few customers 75.0% 0.0% 19.2% 33.3% 46.7% 10.3% 71.8% 25.0% 71.8% 4".3%
Assets Causes 1.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 1% 0.2%
Excessive fixed assets 6."% 0.0% 8.3% 33.3% 25.0% 25,0% 8,8% 60,0% -.4% 12. 5"..
Over expansion 93.3% 0.0% 91.7% 66.-% 75.0% 75.0% 91.2% 40.0% 92.6% 8".5%
Capital Causes 0,1% 0.3% 0.6% 0.67. 0.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5%
Burdensome contracts 12.5°.o 50.0°,o 33.3% -J~> 1o*^ 15.4% 8.-'% 14,0% 50.0% 8.5% r.fc%
Excessive withdrawals 68."% 0.0% 25.6% 22.2°o 15.4% 39.1% 34.9% 25.0% 39.0% y^.^".o
Inadequate start capacitv 18.8% 50.0% 41.1% 55.6% 69.2% 52.2% 51.1% 25.0% 52.5% 48.6°.,
Du. u.thrfjct rhjlsi)mLUllj-cv jrr .111[nhuuJ til a *.i ,nihin.i:,rnof CJusci, thr tout 1,1 ihc mjior CJtrp'incs fxvcf.!h 11111,11'v,
Thi- iiijnidujl mJior cJli-L'n'. i.Mjl v^.i'.un.nc..wh„-u-.hrr.u,nl. in,mm„u„c..ci;orici
;x' r;-. n..
WHY DSD 13,061 BUSI





MANUFICTl'RERS WHOLESALERS RETAILERS CONSTRUCTION SERVICE CONCERNS
1.9 3.9 3.4 3.0 3.4 3.1 NEGLECT
1.8 2.9 1.2 1.3 0.3 ,1.4 FRAUD
9.9 8.2 14.6 6.8 9.8 11.3
:2.4 13.4 17.5 20.8 21.3 17.4
1S.6 20.8 18.3 19.0 15.2 18.4
52.9 48.7 42.8 47.6 48.0 46.3
UCK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE LINE
UCK OF MANAGERIAL EXPERIENCE
UNBALANCED EXPERIENCE*
INCOMPETENCE
1.1 1.1 0.4 0.8 - 10 DISASTER
1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 - 1.0- - 1.1 REASON UNKNOWN
:oo.o 100.0 100.0 loo.o loo.o loo.o total
1.552 1.255 6.076 2.510 1,368 13.051 NUMBER OF FAILURES
SirO.530 S140.935 555.573 $130,030 S135.3S2 $105,091 AVERAGE LIABILITIES PER FAILURE
'E.\perience no; wc!! rounded in sales, finance, purchasing, and production on the part of an '.r.dividual
in case of a proprietorship, or of two or more partners or officers constituting a managerr.er.t unit.
-12-
MESSES FAIL IN 1966?













































































Inadequate Sales 42.6 43.2 46.6 23.5 42.1 40.
S
Hea%T Operating E.Npenses 143 9.8 5.2 33.6 15.0 13.4
Receivables Difficulties 14.5 IS.l 5.7 14.5 6.4 9.9
Inventory Difficulties 4.0 7.2 8.5 2.5 1.2 5.S
Excessive Fi.xed Assets 6.7 2.3 3.3 3.5 8.1 4.2
Poor Location 1.1 1.7 6.1 0.7 3.2 3.6
Comoetitive Weakness 21.0 20.2 26.1 22.8 25.2 24.1
Other 6.9 5.7 3.0 4.3 2.6 4.0
Evidenced by inability to avoid
Mnditions which resulted in . .
Some of these occurrences could







































TOTAL FAILURES 14.2 9.6 46.5 19 2 10.5 100.
Because some failures are attributed to a combination of apparent causes, the to-













c.l External causes of
small construction firm
failures.
'^c'.xbJ^

